



s in forest, park, rangeland, and wildlife management be 
ad
Questions pertaining to decision making authority, legitimacy, 
                                                       
Statutory Detail and Administrative Discretion 
in Public Lands Governance: Arguments and 
Alternatives 
This Article explores a central question in public lands governance: 
should Congress or bureaucracy be primarily responsible for 
resolving controversial political conflicts over public lands 
management?  The question of institutional venue and decision 
making legitimacy is receiving increased attention, due in part to a 
number of high profile environmental conflicts that have been 
managed through administrative rulemaking and resource planning 
processes, like the United States Forest Service’s (USFS) roadless 
rule and the issue of snowmobiles in Yellowstone National Park.  In 
short, in what institutional venue should various issues and 
controversie
dressed? 
Public land agencies are increasingly being asked to resolve 
controversial political issues using processes outlined in the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),1 the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA),2 and various resource planning statutes.  This 
Article explores whether or not these types of issues should be 
answered by our public land agencies, by our political representatives 
in Congress, or through other institutional designs.  It is written as a 
primer of sorts, one that I hope will be useful as more people begin 
debating this important question.  Public land policy reform is 
currently a popular topic, with dozens of proposals seeking to change 
the land management regime in significant ways.3  Important to most 
of those proposals, however, is the enduring tension between statutory 
detail and bureaucratic discretion in public lands management.  
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224 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 19(2), 2004] 
 
A common response to this issue is “I agree in principle that 
Congress should decide—but let’s not have this Congress decide.”  
Related to this is the important distinction between political theory 
and practice.  Instead of pitting a romanticized legislative ideal 
accountability, and the most appropriate venue for conflict resolution 
must be at the forefront of this important discussion. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Following the Introduction, 
Part I provides an overview of our dominant public land laws, 
including those governing forest, park, rangeland, and wildlife 
management.  They are analyzed in terms of what they say and fail to 
say, and why this matters from a conflict management standpoint.  
The vagueness, ambiguity, contradiction, and over-extended 
commitments in some of these laws are the major reasons why 
administrative rulemaking and planning processes have become the 
dominant ways of dealing with public lands conflict. 
Part II then reviews the political and philosophical debate over 
congressional delegation of authority and agency discretion as it 
applies to public lands-based political conflict.  Do our public land 
management agencies have too much managerial discretion?  Should 
Congress, bureaucracy, or some other governing arrangement resolve 
value and interest-based political disputes?  This part explores those 
questions by reviewing the case for and against statutory detail and 
administrative discretion.  This Article synthesizes the important 
work that has been done in that area and applies it to the problems and 
challenges of public lands governance. 
Part III then sketches a broad “options and alternatives” 
framework.  Alternatives in prescriptive law, administrative 
leadership and discretion, decentralization, comprehensive public land 
law review, and policy experimentation are discussed and analyzed.  I 
make a cautious and qualified argument that there is too much 
administrative discretion delegated to agencies, and that Congress or 
other democratic institutions should resolve the essential value and 
interest-based political conflicts over public lands management.  
Public land agencies, using rulemaking, NEPA, and planning 
processes, are usually ill-equipped to resolve what are often deeply 
divisive and intractable political conflicts.  They are not the most 
legitimate arbiters of the public good.  Instead, our political 
representatives in Congress or reconstituted citizen-based democratic 
bodies should be making those choices.  But, as illustrated throughout 
this Article, that is easier said than done, and the prescriptive cure 
might be worse than the disease. 
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administrative discretion issue becomes 
more of a Hobson’s choice. 
STATUTORY GUIDA  IN PUBLIC 
LANDS GOVERNANCE 
sions, while others highlight the “supply of 
tim
                                                       
against the modern administrative state, we should contrast the latter 
with how legislative decisions are made in practice.  Once this is 
done, our enthusiasm for congressional responsibility is dimmed, and 
the statutory detail versus 
I 
NCE AND THE LACK THEREOF
A.  Forest Management4
In making controversial decisions, agencies look to their statutory 
mission and mandate for guiding principles or explicit instructions 
from Congress.  The 1897 Forest Service Organic Act, for example, 
states in part that “[n]o national forest shall be established, except to 
improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the 
purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to 
furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of 
citizens of the United States[.]”5  This broad mandate6 provides little 
resolution because some interest groups emphasize the “protect” and 
“water flows” provi
ber” component.7
Superimposed on top of the Organic Act is the Multiple Use 
Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA).8 Through MUSYA, 
Congress formally articulated the multiple use mission of the service: 
“It is the policy of the Congress that the national forests are 
 
4 This forest management review section is taken from Martin Nie, Administrative 
Ru
. 
d by the USFS Organic Act has been open to some 
in
nning Incompatible With a 
La
lemaking and Public Lands Conflict:  The Forest Service’s Roadless Rule, 44 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 687 (2004). 
5 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2000)
6 What Congress intende
terpretation throughout the years.  Note that the language actually puts forth three 
purposes for the National Forests, not just the commonly cited water flows and supply of 
timber purposes.  And one would think that issues like wildlife would be impacted by the 
“improve and protect the forest” language found therein.  See United States v. New 
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting in part) (discussing the intent of the 
USFS Organic Act to resolve a reserved water rights dispute). 
7 See generally Alan G. McQuillan, Is National Forest Pla
nd Ethic, 88 J. FORESTRY 31 (1990) (discussing the contested purposes of the forest 
reserves, and how preservationist John Muir would have emphasized the “improve and 
protect the forest” provision, while USFS Chief Gifford Pinchot would more likely have 
stressed the “furnish a continuous supply of timber” provision). 
8 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (2000). 
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and wildlife and fish purposes.”9  The Act defines 
“mu





established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, 
timber, watershed, 
ltiple” use as: 
The management of all the various renewable surface resources of 
the national forests so that they are utilized in the combination that 
will best meet the needs of the American people; making the most 
judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources or related 
services over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for 
periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and 
conditions; that some land will be used for less than all of the 
resources; and harmonious and coordinated management of the 
various resources, each with the other, without impairment of the 
productivity of the land, with consideration being given to the 
relative values of the various resources, and not necessarily the 
combination of uses t
greatest unit output.
This statutory language shows that there is relatively little in 
MUSYA directing or constraining forest managers.11  They are to 
manage for multiple use and sustained yield, the latter meaning “the 
achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or 
regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the
tional forests without impairment of the productivity of the land.”12
The contested language in MUSYA is easy to find.  For instance, 
what are the needs of the American people and what constitutes the 
most judicious use of the land?  What does providing “due 
consideration” of “the relative values of the various resources in 
particular areas” really mean?13  More problematic is the Act’s failure 
to specify the spatial scale for implementing multiple use: either on a 
forest-by-forest level or on a national forest system level?14  This is 
                                                        
9 Id. § 528. 
lly Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and Public Lands:  Why 
“M
). 
of American Foresters (SAF) review, for example, recommends that 
“C
10 Id. § 531. 
11 See genera
ultiple Use” Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 407 (1994) (“Since multiple use is 
founded upon a standardless delegation of authority to managers of public lands and 
waters, congressional endorsement of multiple use has created the archetypal ‘special 
interest’ legislation.”). 
12 16 U.S.C. § 531(b
13 Id. § 529. 
14 A Society 
ongress should clearly articulate in new legislation that the concept of multiple use is 
not necessarily appropriate on every management unit, but may be better applied in the 
aggregate across the national forests and public lands.”  SOCIETY OF AMERICAN 
FORESTERS, FOREST OF DISCORD:  OPTIONS FOR GOVERNING OUR NATIONAL FORESTS 
AND FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS 54-55 (Donald W. Floyd ed., 1999). 
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literature about NFMA’s impact on forest management.  Some critics 
   
 
not to say that MUSYA says nothing of importance, the multiple use 
mission later proved to be a major challenge for an agency that 
became focused primarily on dominant use timber production.15  But, 
its abstractness has been used by the USFS over the years to defend 
everything from designating 58.5 million acres as protected roadless 
areas to proposing an 8.7 billion board foot timber sale in the Tongass 
National Forest in Southeast Alaska.16  Multiple uses could be 
complimentary and not contradictory according to the USFS.  For 
example, it could embrace clearcutting as a way to p
enings for browsing game species and simultaneously achieve its 
timber, wildlife, and recreation (hunting) purposes.17
The multiple use mandate was also used to justify the extensive 
clearcutting and terracing of hillsides in the Bitterroot National Forest 
in western Montana, though many saw it as more akin to “timber 
mining.”18  That case provided one spark in what would eventually 
become the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA).19  It 
is primarily a planning-based statute, calling for new interdisciplinary 
forest planning processes and expanded opportunities for public 
participation.  Some important prescriptions are also found in the Act, 
including a limit on the size of clearcuts and a mandate to “provide 
for diversity of plant and ani
d capability of the specific land area in order to meet overall 
multiple-use objectives[.]”20
There has been a lot of debate in forestry, policy, and academic 
                                                     
15 DAVID A. CLARY, TIMBER AND THE FOREST SERVICE 156 (1986).  Clary provides a 
critical history of the USFS and its unique bureaucratic timber-oriented culture as “a case 
of public service wherein the servant believed firmly that it knew better than the public 
w
OPTIMISM:  MANAGEMENT OF THE 
N
ot National Forest, Congressional Record, November 18, 
19
 Forest 
M 9 (1996) (providing an overview of the NFMA). 
hat the public really wanted.”  Id. at xii. 
16 See Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 104 (D. Alaska 1971). 
17 See generally PAUL W. HIRT, A CONSPIRACY OF 
ATIONAL FORESTS SINCE WORLD WAR TWO (1994). 
18 The “Bolle Report,” a major milestone in USFS history and requested by Senator Lee 
Metcalf of Montana, aptly summarized the situation:  “Multiple use management, in fact, 
does not exist as the governing principle on the Bitterroot National Forest.”  See A 
University View of the Forest Service, A Select Committee of the University of Montana 
Presents Its Report on the Bitterro
70, at 1. (on file with author). 
19 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14 (2000).  See Michael J. Gippert & Vincent L. DeWitte, The 
Nature of Land and Resource Management Planning Under the National
anagement Act, 3 ENVTL. L. 14
20 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). 
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contend that NFMA is a “solution to a nonexistent problem.”21  The 
Bitterroot and Monongahela22 cases had nothing to do with planning, 
says Richard Behan, so why “solve” these local site-specific problems 
with elaborate planning requirements?23 Federico Cheever also argues 
that the forest management standards outlined in NFMA have failed 
to provide a significant check on USFS timber management practices 
because they have failed to communicate an intelligible message to 
the lawyers, Forest Service officials and federal judges who initiate, 
defend, and resolve claims asserted under them.24  This failure to 
communicate generally intelligible content, says Cheever, is a “result 
of Congress’s commitment to Forest Service discretion in the 
legislative process that gave us NFMA.”25  In a similar vein, Michael 
Mortimer argues that the problems currently afflicting the USFS 
result from Congress avoiding responsibility for difficult resource 
management decisions.26  He
utes governing the USFS: 
Congressional direction to the Forest Service has been less than 
specific, affording little in the way of a concrete agency mission.  
Consequently, the Forest Service’s attempts at resource 
management have been plagued by controversy and litigation, 
ultimately imbuing the agency with a sort of administrati
schizophrenia, unable to identify or even recognize its mission.
On the other hand, both Jack Tuholske and Beth Brennan argued a 
decade ago that this substantive environmental statute was beginning 
to fulfill its mandate.28  They claim that it provides the direction the 
                                                        
21 R.W. Behan, The RPA/NFMA:  Solution to a Nonexistent Problem, 88(5) J. 
FORESTRY, 20-25 (May 1990). 
22 The famous Monongahela decision by the Fourth Circuit ruled that the 1897 Organic 
A
e Can Learn from the 
H
 The Delegation of Law-Making Authority to the United States 
Fo
ske & Beth Brennan, The National Forest Management Act: Judicial 
In
ct effectively prohibited clearcutting in national forests, and this eventually led to the 
passage of NFMA.  Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975).  See 
generally Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in 
the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1, 41-42, 73-74, 138, 154-55 (1985). 
23 RICHARD W. BEHAN, PLUNDERED PROMISE 193-94 (2001). 
24 Federico Cheever, Four Failed Forest Standards: What W
istory of the National Forest Management Act’s Substantive Timber Management 
Provisions, 77 OR. L. REV. 601, 605 (1998). 
25 Id. at 606. 
26 Michael J. Mortimer,
rest Service:  Implications in the Struggle for National Forest Management, 54 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 907, 912 (2002). 
27 Id. at 910. 
28 Jack Tuhol
terpretation of a Substantive Environmental Statute, 15 PUB. LAND L. REV. 53, 130 
(1994). 
Administrative Discretion in Public Lands Governance 229 
 




                                                       
agency needs to adopt a more holistic and ecosystem-based approach 
to forest management.  But for this to h
see it as having substance, enforce its underlying purpose, and 
“read and interpret the statute as a whole rather than analyze statutory 
sections in isolation from each other.”29
Others, like Charles Wilkinson, believe that while NFMA struggles 
to find a balance between statutory directives and agency discretion, it 
has had a substantive and procedural impact on forest management, 
and it is broad-textured and elastic enough to respond to future 
needs.30  Another view, argued by the late Arnold Bolle, who played 
an important role in the Act’s creation, is that NFMA is a good law, 
but that its intent has not been faithfully implemented by the USFS.31  
In short, NFMA added a planning element to the forest ma
licies and multiple use mandates of the Organic Act and MUSYA.  
It did not take away a lot of management authority from the USFS, 
and it continues to be subject to a range of interpretations.32
The tension between congressional prescription and agency 
discretion was very apparent in drafting the NFMA and the ensuing 
debate in Congress.33 The USFS favored the planning-based NFMA 
bill sponsored by Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota,34 and 
fought against the more prescriptive NFMA bill proposed by Senator 
Jennings Randolph of West Virginia.35  Unlike Humphrey’s version, 
 
29 Id. at 134. 
30 Charles F. Wilkinson, The National Forest Management Act: The Twenty Years 
Behind, The Twenty Years Ahead, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 659, 677 (1997). 
31 Arnold W. Bolle, The Bitterroot Revisited:  “A University [Re]View of the Forest 
Service,” in AMERICAN FORESTS:  NATURE, CULTURE, AND POLITICS 163 (Char Miller 
ed., 1997) (arguing that NFMA is not the problem, rather the problem is the USFS’s 
“business as usual” response to NFMA). 
32 For example, the Wilderness Society interprets NFMA as Congress recognizing “the 
shortcomings of MUSYA’s broad [grant of] discretion and sought to insure that timber 
production would not take priority over other uses and resources.”  ELIZABETH BEAVER ET 
AL., UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER, SEEING THE 
FOREST SERVICE FOR THE TREES 13 (2000), available at 
http://www.colorado.edu/law/centers/nrlc /publications/Forestry_Reforms_Report.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2004), quoting THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, AMERICA’S NATIONAL 
FORESTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 19.  But the Society of American Foresters contends that 
neither the 1974 Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Act (RPA) or NFMA 
“changed management philosophy in a significant way.”  Id. at 14. 
33 See generally Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 22. 
34 S. 3091, 94th Cong. (1976). 
35 S. 2926, 94th Cong. (1976); see generally Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 22 at 
42; DENNIS C. LE MASTER, DECADE OF CHANGE:  THE REMAKING OF FOREST SERVICE 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY DURING THE 1970S (1984). 






 and an overextended commitment to 
int
                                                       
the Randolph bill provided for comprehensive reform that prescribed 
numerous specific standards for forest management, with a particular 
focus on fish and wildlife habitat and even-aged management.36  
While the two sponsors agreed that timber production had taken 
priority over other forest values, and that that needed to be fixed, they 
differed in how much discretion to give the USFS.37  In the end, some 
compromises were made and Humphrey included the
iversity requirement” into his bill that would eventually become 
law.38 Diversity, however, was not defined in the Act, and it was up 
to the USFS to give this term meaning in their regulations.39
The point of this statutory review is to illustrate the lack of explicit 
guidance in how the USFS should answer management questions that 
are value and interest based, and political to the core.  The political 
might and leadership of Gifford Pinchot helps explain the broad 
mandate expressed in the 1897 Organic Act.  According to Federico 
Cheever, Gifford Pinchot sought congressional support wi
ngressional supervision and won it in the carte blanche given to 
him in the “paradoxical” USFS Organic Act.40 It is in this statutory 
vacuum that Pinchot left his indelible signature on the Service.41
MUSYA and NFMA also failed to answer the central philosophical 
questions regarding forest management.  This vacuum was instead 
filled by an opportunistic type of politics wherein the agency could 
promise everything to everyone in the name of “intensive 
management” and multiple use.  Unrealistic promises made to 
multiple use constituencies
ensive management would become the Agency’s Achilles’ heel 
 
36 S. 2926, 94th Cong. (1976). 
37 Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 22, at 292-93. 
38 The provision requires the USFS to “provide for diversity of plant and animal 
communities based on the suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to 
meet overall multiple-use objectives[.]”  16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2000). 
39 USFS Planning regulations on fish and wildlife resources state that:  habitat “shall be 
managed to maintain viable populations” of existing species.  36 C.F.R. 219.19. See 
generally Michael A. Padilla, The Mouse That Roared:  How the National Forest 
Management Act Diversity of Species Provision is Changing Public Timber Harvesting, 15 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 113 (1996-1997). 
40 Federico Cheever, The United States Forest Service and National Park Service:  
Paradoxical Mandates, Powerful Founders, and the Rise and Fall of Agency Discretion, 
74 DENV. U. L. REV. 625 (1997). 
41 See generally CHAR MILLER, GIFFORD PINCHOT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
ENVIRONMENTALISM (2001). 
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according to historian Paul Hirt, who views USFS history as a 
“conspiracy of optimism.”42
From Pinchot through NFMA, the USFS has fought for maximum 
levels of administrative discretion, and Congress has largely obliged.  
As a result, the venue of conflict has shifted from Congress to the 
administrative arena.  And while discretion once gave the USFS 
unencumbered authority to manage the public lands under the guise of 
scientific management, it now plagues the Agency in unending 
lawsuits and administrative appeals because many interest groups 
believe that the USFS’s actions are inconsistent with congressional 
direction.  While professional foresters once fought to preserve their 
discretion, many forest policy leaders are now calling for 
management priorities to be set through a political and legislative 
process.43  A Society of Ameri
ample, contends that “[t]he purposes of the national forests and 
public lands are no longer clear,” that the complex and serious 
problems of national forest management “cannot be resolved through 
regulatory reform or through the appropriations process,” and that 
“new legislation is warranted.”44
What about the hundreds of other laws, regulations, and court 
decisions constraining agency behavior?45  The USFS has recently 
made “analysis paralysis” and “the process predicament” central to its 
case that the agency is forced to do more paperwork than on-the-
ground forest management these days.46  The argument goes that 
while MUSYA and NFMA might give the USFS some discretion in 
theory, it is lost upon the thick layering of other laws and 
regulations.47  There is some truth to this claim, both Congress and 
the Agency’s own implementing regulations have added enormous 
procedural and analytical obligations.  But, that does not change the 
                                                        
42 HIRT, supra note 17, at xxi. 
43 See generally SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS, supra note 14. 
y Forest Service Directives, available at http://www.fs.fed.us/im/ 
di
ss Predicament:  How Statutory, Regulatory, and 
Ad
e Conflicting Laws and Regulations:  Gridlock on the National Forests, Oversight 
H
44 Id. at 50-51. 
45 See generall
rectives/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
46 USDA Forest Service, The Proce
ministrative Factors Affect National Forest Management (June 2002), available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/documents/Process-Predicament.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 
2004). 
47 Se
earing Before the House Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health of the Committee 
on Resources, 107th Cong. (Dec. 4, 2001) (Statement of Dale Bosworth, Chief, USDA 
Forest Service). 
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nd mostly procedural laws while failing to confront the 
tough questions regarding forest management.  The agency still has 
discretion, but it m l steps to exercise 
it. 
icated it as a “public park or pleasuring ground for the 
be







nown as national parks, monuments, and 
                                                       
basic argument made here. Congress has passed additional 
substantive a
ust now take numerous procedura
 It is a case study in inefficient discretion.  Until Congress clarifies 
the central purpose of our national forest lands and the core mission 
of the USFS, procedural and decision making inefficiencies will be a 
fact of life.48
B.  National Park Management 
The USFS situation is not atypical—similar patterns emerge in 
park politics.  The first seeds of confusion were perhaps planted in the 
nineteenth century.  Congress created Yellowstone National Park in 
1872 and ded
nefit and enjoyment of the people.”49  Less noted is language 
giving exclusive control to the Secretary of the Interior, whom “shall 
make regulations providing for the preservation, 
liation, of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, 
ders, within the park, and their retention in their natural 
dition.”50
fter the piecemeal creation of Yellowstone and other park
gress tried to provide some general direction in the National Pa
ice (NPS) Organic Act of 1916.  It declared that: 
The service thus established shall promote and regulate the use of 
the Federal areas k
reservations . . . by such means and measures as conform to the 
fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and 
reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the 
natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide 
 
48 In an often-cited report, the General Accounting Office summarizes the decision 
making problem facing the Service: 
Strengthening accountability for performance within the Forest Service and 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of its decision-making is contingent on 
establishing long-term strategic goals that are based on clearly defined mission 
priorities.  However, agreement does not exist on the agency’s long-term strategic 
goals.  This lack of agreement is the result of a more fundamental disagreement, 
both inside and outside the Forest Service, over which uses the agency is to 
emphasize under its broad multiple-use and sustained-yield mandate and how best 
to ensure the long-term sustainability of these uses. 
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREST SERVICE DECISION-MAKING:  A 
FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING PERFORMANCE, GAO/RCED-97-71, at 5 (1997). 
49 16 U.S.C. § 21 (2000). 
50 Id. § 22. 
Administrative Discretion in Public Lands Governance 233 
 West Sellars contends that tourism and public use 
ha
but it also encouraged development and use—at times 
 
for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as 
will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations.51
Is the NPS Organic Act a contradictory mandate?  Some say that it 
is not: when push comes to shove, preservation rules.  Historian 
Robin Winks, for example, argues that despite the difficulties in 
ascertaining congressional intent, the 1916 Act is not contradictory, 
especially when we consider the gist of subsequent legislation52 and 
its judicial interpretation.  For him, the mandate to conserve and leave 
resources unimpaired takes precedence over providing means of 
access and public enjoyment.53  But, others believe that the NPS’s 
historical bias to recreational tourism has a statutory basis.  Park 
historian Richard
ve explicit congressional sanction: “This authority was strongly 
reaffirmed in the National Park Service Act of 1916, with its 
emphasis on public use.  Not only did Congress not challenge the 
Park Service’s interpretation of the act during the ensuing decades, 
aggressively.”54
                                                        
51 Id. § 1. 
52 See, e.g., National Park System General Authorities Act, Pub. L. No. 91-383, §1, 8
t. 825 (1970) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §1a-1; The Redwood Act of 1978, Pu
No. 95-250, §101(b), 92 Stat. 166 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §1a-1), provid
itional language for park managers.  In it Congress declares that: 
These areas derive increased national dignity and recognition of their superb 
environmental quality through their inclusion jointly with each other in one national 
park system preserved and managed for the benefit and inspiration of all the people 
of the United States; and that . . . the various areas of the National Park system shall 
be consistent with and founded in the purpose established by section 1 of this title, 
to the common benefit of all the people of the United States.  The authorization of 





d administration of 





bbied for the act sought a mandate for an exacting 
these areas shall be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of the 
National Park System and shall not be exercise
purposes for which these various areas have been established, except as may have 
been or shall be directly and specifically provided by Congress. 
53 Robin W. Winks, The National Park Service Act of 1916:  “A Contradictor
ndate”?, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 575, 623 (1997). 
54 RICHARD WEST SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS:  A
TORY 285 (1997). 
[T]he legislative history of the Organic Act provides no evidence that either 
Congress or those who lo
preservation of natural conditions.  An examination of the motivations and 
perceptions of the Park Service’s founders reveals that their principal concerns 
were the preservation of scenery, the economic benefits of tourism, and efficient 
management of the parks.” 
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ecosystem that can only be 
p, Drive Jeep”) notes that “the 
fu
Historians are not the only ones to differ on the meaning of the 
1916 Act.  Different interests continue to cling to different language.  
The controversy over banning snowmobiles in Yellowstone and 
Grand Teton National Parks and the John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 
Memorial Parkway i
onse to the NPS’s Winter Use Plan, Supplemental Environmen
act Statement illustrate how differently this park mandate 
rpreted by various political actors.  The Montana Touris
lition writes that: 
We are opposed to the ban because it eliminates yet another access 
possibility for the people of the United States.  At what point does 
Yellowstone become a wilderness 
viewed from outside a bubble?  Our forefathers intentions were 
clear when they said Yellowstone National Park was created as a 
‘public park or pleasuring-ground for the benefit and enjoyment of 
the people.’  In order for the public to understand nature they need 
to see, hear, feel, smell and taste it.55
Turning these parks into de facto wilderness areas is a concern for 
other groups.  The American Council of Snowmobile Associations 
writes that “[i]t is mind-boggling to think that ‘The People’s Park’ is 
actually being turned into ‘Wilderness’ which will eventually allow 
no entrance to the first and one of the most fascinating National Parks 
in our Country.”56  Citizens for a User Friendly Forest (with the motto 
“Red Meat, Board Feet, Dig Dee
ndamental purpose of the Park is to conserve park resources and 
values, while providing for the enjoyment of those resources and 
values by the American people.  The dual purpose is coequal; neither 
is more important than the other.”57
Those in favor of the ban also cite the Organic Act and other 
relevant policies to make their case.  The Alliance for the Wild 
Rockies writes that “[t]he NPS Organic Act and numerous NPS 
Management Policies clearly illustrate that when presented with a 
conflict between resource protection and any other interest[s], 
                                                                                                                       
Id. at 29.  Sellars also suggests the park founders “assumed that, in effect, undeveloped 
lands were unimpaired lands—that where there was little or no development, natural 
conditions existed and need not be of special concern.  The ongoing manipulation of the 
parks’ backcountry resources, such as fish, forests, and wildlife seems not to have been 
viewed as impairing natural conditions.” Id. at 45. 
55 NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, WINTER USE PLANS:  FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, VOL. 2 130 (2003). 
56 Id. at 114. 
57 Id. at 122. 
Administrative Discretion in Public Lands Governance 235 
reso re, 
sno ce 






ted in an unimpaired 
                                                       
 
urce conservation is to be predominant.  Therefo
wmobiling, which has been irrefutably shown to cause resour
radation and pose human health risks, must be stopped.”
ments of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Natural Resourc
ense Council, The Wilderness Society, Defenders of Wildli
ra Club, the Wyoming Outdoor Council, and other groups mak
1916 Organic Act and its prohibition on impairment central 
r case against snowmobiling in the Park.  They note the following: 
The Park Service duty under governing law, regulation and policy is 
to assure that national park resources are protec
state for the benefit and enjoyment of this and future generations.  
The NPS mission was clearly elucidated by Congress and has been 
reaffirmed over the years . . . .  In Yellowstone and Grand Teton 
National Parks, the highest standard of protection—Organic Act 
prohibition on impairment—is violated by snowmobile use . . . .  
The intent of Congress was to preserve the scenery, natural objects 
and wildlife of the National Parks . . . .  The courts have time and 
again interpreted the Organic Act as holding conservation of park 
resources preeminent over enjoyment of them; visitor use must not 
cause impairment of park resources and values.59
The vacuum left by Congress and the Organic Act has been filled 
with various agency interpretations and management philosophies.60  
The NPS has historically prioritized its public use obligation over 
preservation as a way to build a supportive constituency.  This helps 
explain its cozy relationship to the railroad industry, the elimination 
of wolves, suppression of fire, introduction of exotic game and fish 
species, and the road building frenzy of Mission ‘66.  This “industrial 
recreation” model could be defended using the Organic Act, but so 
too could the preservationist philosophy espoused in the influential 
“Leopold Report” recommending the preservation and restoration of 
natural conditions so that national parks can represent “a vignette of 
primitive America.”61  Both approaches to park management were 
somehow squared with the NPS’s mandate. 
This contested language often leaves the NPS in politically 
dangerous territory.  What happens when former Interior Secretary 
 
 EXPERIENCE (2d ed. 1987); 
JO
w, Policy, and 
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58 Id. at 140. 
59 Id. at 157-58. 
60 For a few thoughtful discussions of these philosophies and management approaches 
see generally SELLARS, supra note 54; WILLIAM R. LOWRY, THE CAPACITY FOR WONDER 
(1994); ALFRED RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS:  THE AMERICAN
SEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS (1980). 
61 See Robert B. Keiter, Preserving Nature in the National Parks:  La
ience in a Dynamic Environment, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 649, 656 (1997). 




nagement standards and 
ob
James Watt claims that “[i]f I err, I’m going to be erring on the people 
side,” and the NPS Director William Penn Mott claims that “we must 
err on the side of preservation”?62  Committed agency personnel are 
often caught in the crossfire.  Some park visitors also feel discontent, 
for they believe that the NPS is not fulfilling its mandate to either 
preserve the resource or provide maximum recreational opportunities. 
This paradoxical mandate has a history similar to that of Pinchot 
and the USFS.  Cheever’s analysis is that Stephen Mather, the first 
Director of the NPS, fought for enthusiastic congressional support of 
the national parks without congressional participation in their 
management and won it in the carte blanche given to him in the
ganic Act.63  The problem, says Cheever, is that these broad 
mandates given to Pinchot and Mather for pursuing their own vision 
and philosophy now “allow interest groups to project their visions 
onto the congressional mandates.”64  In short, times have changed: 
“ambiguity which once provided agencies necessary latitude before 
Congress and the Cabinet now inspire sophisticated western interest 
groups to challenge agency policy.  Mandates which once contributed 
to the rise of agency discretion now contribute to its decline.”65
Politics and conflict are also driven by individually tailored 
establishment statutes governing specific park units.66  While the 
Organic Act provides an overarching mandate for the NPS, Congress 
has increasingly provided specific ma
ligations in park-by-park establishment legislation.67  This means 
that organic legislation applies to all park system units to the extent 
that it does not conflict with provisions specifically applicable to 
them.68  Many substantive and procedural mandates and exemptions 
are written into laws pertaining to one particular management unit.  
Examples include provisions allowing grazing, topics that must be 
addressed in general management plans, consultation requirements, 
and the creation of advisory commissions. 
                                                        
62 William R. Lowry, National Parks Policy, in WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 182 (Charles Davis ed., 2d ed., 2001). 
63 Cheever, supra note 40, at 633. 
64 Id. at 640. 
65 Id. at 630. 
66 See generally Robert Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail in National Park 
Establishment Legislation and its Relationship to Pollution Control Law, 74 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 779, 787-789 (1997) (describing the general trend in Congress in providing greater 
statutory detail in pollution control law and park establishment legislation). 
67 16 U.S.C. § 1c (2000). 
68 Id. § 1c(b). 
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ent.  As discussed later, this can be seen as either a positive 
or
tion governing one 
national forest or other land unit.  The drawback of such an approach 
is that a public land ohesive, integrated, 
an
and mandate.  It manages 262 million acres of land—roughly one-
ei
Establishment legislation, while often overlooked, is important for 
a number of reasons.69  First, it shows the increasing tendency and 
ability of Congress to get involved in the details of public lands 
managem
 negative development.  For instance, while it places more 
responsibility and accountability on our elected representatives, it can 
also hamper comprehensive planning and dilute the importance of 
administrative and scientific expertise.  Establishment legislation can 
also exacerbate park conflicts; not only is the NPS supposed to find 
the right tension between preservation and recreation, but in some 
cases it must also work in the particular and sometimes contradictory 
uses and exemptions, which are expressed in individualized park 
statutes. 
We might also look at the park situation for lessons in public lands 
governance.  It illustrates that making changes in an agency’s organic 
act will not necessarily lead to changes on the ground because some 
public land units are also governed by unique establishment laws.70  
The situation could also foreshadow what might happen if Congress 
attempts to experiment with site-specific legisla
s system would become less c
d unified.  Instead, we would get a balkanized patchwork that 
would make it difficult to understand the essential purpose of our 
national parks.  The upside, however, is that individualized statutes 
might provide a way to protect places that would not otherwise be 
included in the national park system.  In other words, the next era of 
place protection will be more difficult than the last, and it will require 
new ways of thinking and models of governance. 
C.  Rangeland Management 
The amount of land managed by the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) illustrates the importance of this Agency’s statutory mission 
ghth of the U.S.—and another 300 million acres of subsurface 
                                                        
69 See Fischman, supra note 66, at 781-86. 
70 See id. at 782.  “An examination of establishment legislation reveals that simple 
clarification of the Organic Act to stress the preservation prong of the Service’s dual 
mandate, or even amending the Organic Act to embrace explicitly biological diversity, 
would not be sufficient to achieve comprehensive reform.  Establishment legislation, 
which guides the management and planning for individual parks would also need to be 
revisited.” Id. 
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unle  it 
mea
n-renewable resources, 
mineral resources.71  It primarily manages these lands according to 
the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976.72  This 
Act is referred to as the BLM Organic Act because it consolidated and 
articulated the Agency’s mi
Added on top of FLPMA was the Public Rangelands Improvement 
Act of 1978 (PRIA).73  This Act expressed concern about the 
productive potential and unsatisfactory condition of public 
rangelands, and it declared a national policy for improving the range.  
Specifically, it outlined steps to improve the range, including record-
keeping requirements, increased funding for range improvement, and 
a new grazing fee formula. 
LPMA says a number of important things.74
75
  First, it explici
es that “the public lands be retained in Federal ownership;”  thu
ing an unequivocal message to those advocating the release 
ral lands to state or private ownership.  It also states th
nagement be on the basis of multiple use and sustained yi
ss otherwise specified by law.”76  Congress also stated what
nt by the term multiple use: 
The term “multiple use” means the management of the public lands 
and their various resource values so that they are utilized in the 
combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the 
American people; making the most judicious use of the land for 
some or all of these resources or related services over areas large 
enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use 
to conform to changing needs and conditions; the use of some land 
for less than all of the resources; a combination of balanced and 
diverse resource uses that takes into account the long-term needs of 
future generations for renewable and no
including, but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, 
watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and 
historical values; and harmonious and coordinated management of 
the various resources without permanent impairment of the 
productivity of the land and the quality of the environment with 
                                                        
71 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, Table 1.4 (2002), 
available at www.blm.gov/natacq/pls02/plsl-4_02.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
72 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). 
 Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1 (1983) (analyzing FLPMA 
an . 
e Use Act (CMU Act) of 1964.  
Pu . 986 (1964) (expired 1970). 
73 Id. §§ 1901-1908. 
74 See generally George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV:  
FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple
d its planning requirements)
75 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1). 
76 Id. § 1701(a)(7).  FLPMA reaffirmed the principle of multiple use and sustained 
yield originally found in the Classification and Multipl
b. L. No. 88-607, 78 Stat
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77
enefits to the public 
ag
                                                       
consideration being given to the relative values of the resources and 
not necessarily to the combination of uses that will give the greatest 
economic return or the greatest unit output.
The term sustained yield “means the achievement and maintenance 
in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the 
various renewable resources of the public lands consistent with 
multiple use.”78  Elsewhere in the Act, and after the mandate to 
protect various environmental, historical, and archeological values, 
Congress added that “the public lands be managed in a manner which 
recognizes the Nation’s need for domestic sources of minerals, food, 
timber, and fiber from the public lands.”79
One way of thinking about FLPMA is that Congress once again 
chose agency discretion in the form of planning rather than making 
explicit choices.80  Instead of providing clear unequivocal guidance in 
the form of prescriptive law, Congress provided an array of criteria to 
be incorporated or merely considered in the development and revision 
of land-use plans.  Multiple use and sustained yield principles would 
be achieved, for example, by using “a systematic interdisciplinary 
approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical, biological, 
economic, and other sciences.”81  Discretion was also provided by 
simply asking the BLM to consider the “present and potential uses of 
the public lands,”82  and “the relative scarcity of the values 
involved.”83  Additionally, the BLM was asked to “rely, to the extent 
it is available, on the inventory of the public lands, their resources, 
and other values,”84 and to “weigh long-term b
ainst short-term benefits.”85  Some stronger language is also 
provided, like the directions to “give priority to the designation and 
 
). 
tha , because it “directed the BLM to consider disparate values 
in al interest’ without demanding a specific result.”). 
77 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c
78 Id. § 1702(h). 
79 Id. § 1701(a)(12). 
80 See generally ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, MODERN 
PUBLIC LAND LAW 223 (1995) (contending that “[t]he statute lacks both procedural and 
substantive standards, particularly when compared with the NFMA.”); Marla E. 
Ma  Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REV. 801, 834 (1993) (contending nsfield, A Primer of Public
t FLPMA embodies a truce
 furthering the ‘nation
81 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(2). 
82 Id. § 1712(c)(5). 
83 Id. § 1712(c)(6). 
84 Id. § 1712(c)(4). 
85 Id. § 1712(c)(7). 
240 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 19(2), 2004] 
acuum, which 
is 
and goals, and express a concern and desire for range improvement, 
bu 93
 
protection of areas of critical environmental concern,”86 “provide for 
compliance with applicable pollution control laws,”87 and to 
coordinate planning processes with other governments.88  But other 
than the pollution control requirement, which can be quantified and 
monitored, and perhaps the priority given to areas of critical 
environmental concern, those criteria leave a statutory v
filled by the BLM using its planning process. 
Also noteworthy, due to the controversies surrounding its meaning, 
is the discretionary power given to the Secretary of the Interior to 
“take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue 
degradation of the lands.”89  Predictably, of course, over the years 
such a standard has swung widely from one presidential 
administration and solicitor’s opinion to another.90  After all, major 
decisions pertaining to grazing, mining, and even sacred site 
protection depends in large part on whether the emphasis is placed on 
the “unnecessary” or “undue” prongs of this sentence.91
FLPMA is specific and detailed in many ways, especially when it 
comes to how decisions are to be made.92  It says much less, however, 
about what decisions have actually been made by Congress.  As one 
court put it, FLPMA and PRIA provide broad declarations of policy 
t their language “breathes discretion at every pore.”   The broad 
statutory language leaves the BLM open to “agency capture”94 and 
                                                        
86 Id. § 1712(c)(3). 
87 Id. § 1712(c)(8). 
88 Id. § 1712(c)(9). 
89 Id. § 1732(b) (emphasis added). 
90 See Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope:  Cultural Resources on 
Public Lands, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 468-69 (2002) (analyzing such swings of 
interpretation as they apply to cultural resources management on public lands). 
91 Id. 
92 Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of Interior, The Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act, http://www.blm.gov/flpma/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
nguage found in these laws 
do
ATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
Ch. 7
93 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1058 (D. Nev. 1985).  
In this case, Judge Burns states that the broad discretionary la
es not provide helpful standards a court can use to adjudicate agency compliance.  He 
also points his finger at our elected branches of government for why judges have become 
“masters” of various policy areas:  “At bottom, however, the primary reason for the large 
scale unwillingness of the first two branches of our government—both state and federal—
to fashion solutions for significant societal, environmental, and economic problems in 
America.”  Id. at 1063. 
94 See generally GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIV
 (1966); PHILLIP O. FOSS, POLITICS AND GRASS (1960). 
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ample, cite various studies and statistics documenting what they 
be
 professor, Debra Donahue, for example, argues that the 
va
ing the environmental, historical, and cultural language of 
FLPMA, tried to bring the BLM out of its dominant use past by 
designating new  responsibilities 
(e.
 
provides ammunition for various interest groups.95  Conservationists, 
for ex
lieve is dominant use, not multiple use of public rangelands: that 
livestock grazing is allowed on 254 million acres of national forest 
and BLM land (and on these lands roughly 26,300 ranchers graze 3.2 
million cattle),96 that 94 percent of BLM lands in sixteen western 
states are grazed, and that 35 percent of federal wilderness areas have 
active livestock grazing allotments.97  How is this multiple use they 
ask. 
FLPMA can also be used to defend a much different landscape 
vision than the one embraced by the BLM.  Public lands ranching 
critic and law
rious management guidelines in FLPMA “are compatible with a 
policy decision to preserve biodiversity across landscapes.”98  But, 
public land ranchers and their supporters can also point to the 
multiple use mandate and the “nation’s need for domestic sources of 
food” language to make their case.  And, where does it say anything 
in FLPMA about ranching being inimical to biodiversity and 
recreation? 
FLPMA’s discretionary language has resulted in another policy 
vacuum filled by executive-level politics.  President Clinton, 
embrac
monuments and adding management
g., the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument).99  President 
                                                        
95 See generally Kelly Nolen, Residents at Risk:  Wildlife and the Bureau of Land 
Management’s Planning Process, 26 ENVTL. L. 771 (1996).  The “BLM’s vague mandate 
to manage lands for multiple uses also provides the agency with a great deal of discretion 
in making management decisions and leaves it vulnerable to pressure from consumptive 
us
de greater guidance to BLM in its 
pl
eral parts of 
FL
 the land’s productivity or environmental quality, among others.  Id. 
ers who want the agency to favor their preferred use.”  Id. at 776-77.  Among other 
things, Nolen recommends amending FLPMA “to provi
anning and management efforts.” Id. at 837. 
96 Paul Rogers & Jennifer LaFleur, The Giveaway of the West,  SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS, Nov. 7, 1999, at 1S. 
97 Thomas L. Fleischner, Ecological Costs of Livestock Grazing in Western North 
America, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 629, 630 (1994). 
98 DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVISITED 206 (1999).  Sev
PMA are important in this regard she says, including its admonition to consider the 
“relative values” of resources, its focus on the “present and future needs of the American 
people,” and the absence of any mention of local needs, its inclusion of “natural scenic, 
scientific, and historical values,” and the direction to manage all resources without 
impairing
99 See generally Sanjay Ranchod, The Clinton National Monuments: Protecting 
Ecosystems With the Antiquities Act, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 535, 571 (2001) (“The  





Bush, on the other hand, embraces the “nation’s needs” language in 
defending his expansive extractive use agenda.100  The vacuum is t
further filled as these interpretations and agendas are challenged
court. 
D.  Fish and Wildlife Management 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) has regulatory 
authority over the agencies discussed above and must therefore deal 
with the full array of public lands and resources law.  But two laws, 
the 1997 National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act 
(Improvement Act) and the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA), are 
particularly important for purposes here and are discussed below. 
 The National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act (1997) 
The 1997 Improvement Act,101 an amendment to the National 
Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966,102 is the most 
recent organic legislation for a public lands system.  The National 
Wildlife Refuge System, while far flung and fragmented compared to 
other systems, is the “nation’s largest network of lands and most 
diverse array of ecosystems dedicated principally to nature 
protection.”103  As Robert L. Fischman explains, there is a lot that can 
be learned from the Improvement Act, partly due to how it differs 
from other multiple use public land laws.104
A few things are worth quickly pointing out.  First, it is a dominant 
use statute that is geared toward the protection of nature.  Second, 
activities like recreation, oil and gas development, and grazing may 
occur generally only to the extent that they are compatible with this 
dominant use.  Note, however, that the compatibility standard still 
                                                                                                                       
Clinton monument designations are a conscious effort to force a tremendous shift in the 
agency toward management for lighter extractive uses compatible with conservation 
aims.”). 
100 See, e.g., National Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy 




onal goals all offer 
im tal governance generally.” Id. at xiii. 
available at http://www.whitehouse.g
st visited Nov. 21, 2004) 
101 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2
102 Id. §§ 668dd-668ee. 
103 Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of 
Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 458 (2002). 
104 ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES (2003).  “The Refuge 
System’s ecological management criteria, the conflicts between primary and subsidiary 
uses, and the tension between site-specific standards and uniform nati
portant lessons for environmen
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ble uses.”
giving priority to specific refuge purposes.  And if a conflict exists?  
“The conflict shall be resolved in a manner that first protects the 
    
grants quite a bit of discretion to the USFWS based on its “sound 
professional judgment.”105  Third, the Act builds on a tiered and 
hierarchical use framework, ranging from highest to lowest priority.  
This means that individual refuge purposes come before conservation, 
conservation comes before wildlife dependent recreation (e.g., 
hunting and fishing), and wildlife dependent recreation comes before 
other recreational uses and economic activities.  Congress was quite 
clear, moreover, in stating that hunting and fishing, when practiced in 
accordance with sound fish and wildlife management, “are expected 
to continue to be generally compati 106
Finally, and perhaps most important, is the amount of statutory 
detail and substantive management criteria provided in the 
Improvement Act.  This criteria, along with planning and 
participation requirements, includes compatibility; maintenance of 
biological integrity, diversity, and environmental health; acquisition 
of sufficient water rights; biological monitoring; and a general 
conservation stewardship mandate.107  According to Fischman, “[t]he 
greater statutory detail and more binding management prescriptions in 
the 1997 Act, as compared with earlier organic legislation, reflects 
Congress’ greater interest in controlling public land management.”108  
These substantive management criterion not only limit agency 
discretion, but they also provide a foothold for litigation.  They are 
also more specific than those pertaining to National Park and BLM 
lands, and even parts of NFMA.109
Put simply, the choices made and standards expressed in the 
Improvement Act demonstrate the willingness and ability of Congress 
to provide a greater degree of statutory detail.  But, the Improvement 
Act does not resolve all of the issues and conflicts related to wildlife 
refuge management.  Like the NPS situation, refuges have two sets of 
purposes: those articulated in the Improvement Act, and the specific 
purposes for which each refuge was created by Congress.  There is, 
thus, a dual and potentially conflictual nature of the refuge system.  In 
passing the Improvement Act, Congress sought to better integrate the 
system with an overarching statutory mission, while at the same time 
                                                    
d (5)(1). 
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supra note 104, at 110. 
105 16 U.S.C. § 668d
106 Id. § 668dd (2)(6). 
107 Fischman, supra note 103, at
108 Id. at 545. 
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ful case in working our way through 
arg
purposes of the refuge, and, to the extent practicable, that also 
achieves the mission of th 110
The Improvement Act, as Fischman explains, “
harmonize the underlying discord am
stem”111 and “reflects the continual struggle to counteract the 
centrifugal, divergent push of establishment mandates with the 
centripetal, coordinating pull of systemic management.”112 For this 
reason, Fischman cautions that “organic legislation is no panacea for 
public land systems with divergent individual unit establishment 
mandates.”113  As will be discussed later, this issue is of upmost 
importance to public lands governance, for many management units 
are governed under a common organic act and statutory framework, 
while sometimes also governed by individually tailored charters 
established by Congress. 
2. The Endangered Species Act (1973) 
Although not without its share of discretionary language, the ESA 
is also more detailed and specific than other public land and resources 
law.  Its implementation by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(USFWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (also 
known as NOAA Fisheries) is an important part of many 
environmental conflicts.  The infamous snail darter-Tellico Dam case, 
the northern spotted owl, the red-cockaded woodpecker, carn
ntroduction and management (including wolves, grizzly bears, and 
lynx), salmon restoration in the Pacific Northwest, and the Klamath 
River Basin controversy are but a few high profile cases illustrating 
the impact and controversy surrounding the ESA. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has described the ESA as “the most 
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species 
ever enacted by any nation.”114  The ESA’s strict substantive 
provisions, how they have been implemented or not implemented by 
the USFWS and Fisheries, how they have been used by 
environmental interest groups, and how they have been interpreted by 
the courts, provides another help
uments for and against administrative and legislative control. 
                                                        
110 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(d). 
y Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978). 
111 Fischman, supra note 103, at 618. 
112 Id. at 462. 
113 Id. at 464. 
114 Tennessee Valle
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downlisting a  of wolves and grizzly bears. 
 the direct 
The purpose of the ESA is “to provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species 
depend may be conserved.”115  An endangered species is defined as 
“any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a 
significant portion of its range,”116 while a threatened species “means 
any species which is likely to become an endangered
 foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its 
range.”117  To conserve means to use “all methods and procedures 
which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened 
species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this 
Act are no longer necessary.”118
The “significant portion of its range” concept is a bit trickier and 
has become part of the “science wars” over the ESA.  This con
 recently dealt with in Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton.119  In t
, the Ninth Circuit provided the Secretary of the Interior som
retion in giving the concept meaning, since it is not defined in t
ute nor entirely clear from congressional intent.120  This conce
gained renewed attention as conflicts and litigation focus on t
nd delisting
Of course, what Congress meant by these terms, and what they 
intended with the ESA in general, is subject to debate.  Shannon 
Petersen argues that the ESA has had unanticipated consequences.121  
In tracing its legislative history, he concludes that “Congress did not 
intend to pass a law that would protect seemingly insignificant species 
irrespective of economic considerations, halt federal development 
projects, and regulate private property.”122  Instead, he says that: 
most in Congress believed the Act to be a largely symbolic effort to 
protect charismatic megafauna representative of our national 
heritage, like bald eagles, bison, and grizzly bears.  Congress 
believed it could accomplish this simply by preventing
                                                        
115 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
116 Id. § 1532(6). 
sen, Comment, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative 
H  Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 466 (1999). 
t 466-67. 
117 Id. § 1532(20). 
118 Id. § 1532(3). 
119 258 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). 
120 See Linda C. Maranzana, Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton: A Closer Look at the 
‘Significant Portion of Its Range’ Concept, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2002) (assessing the 
extent of this discretion). 
121 Shannon Peter
istory of the Endangered
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“harm degradation.”130  This 
de ry controversial because it gives the 
                                                       
killing of endangered species and by halting the international trade 
in such species.123
Despite congressional intentions, Petersen says, the ESA became 
the “pit bull of environmental laws” due to two factors.  “First, 
Congress and affected interest groups lacked the foresight to” see how 
the statute’s plain language would later be used to put obscure species 
on the list without economic consideration and to stop federal 
development projects.124  Second, scientific developments after 1973, 
including work in ecology and the whole idea of biodiversity, 
presented an entirely different understanding of what it meant to 
ke” or “jeopardize” a species.  “In 1973 it would have been 
difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to anticipate such a 
fundamental change in circumstances” says Petersen.125
Sections 4, 7, and 9 are the ESA’s foundation.  In Section 4, the 
Secretary of the Interior (directing the USFWS) or Secretary of 
Commerce (directing Fisheries) is required to list species as either 
threatened or endangered “solely on the basis of the best sc
d commercial data available.”126  This means that economic factors 
cannot be considered at the listing stage.  Section 7 directs federal 
agencies to consult with the Secretary to “[e]nsure that any action 
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened 
species.”127  Section 9 prohibits the “taking” of endangered species,128 
defined as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”129
It was left to the Secretary of the Interior to provide meaning to 
these terms.  He did so by promulgating a regulation defining the term 
” to include habitat modification or 
ition has proven to be vefin
 
 
123 Id. at 467. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A)(2000). 
127 Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
128 Id. § 1538(a). 
129 Id. § 1532(19). 
130 The regulations define harm as: “[A]n act which actually injures or kills wildlife.  
Such acts may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually 
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including 
breeding, feeding or sheltering.”  50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2003); see Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t. of 
Land & Nat. Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding the lower court’s ruling that 
habitat destruction that could result in extinction is a taking).
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USFWS and Fisheries the power to limit and regulate various land 
use activities and thus, sparked enduring debates over land 
management, private property rights, and government takings. 
The relatively straightforward and prohibitive language found in 
Sections 4, 7, and 9 help explain much of the acrimony over the 
ESA.131  This is not empty rhetoric devoid of meaning and direction.  
Courts have made that abundantly clear through the years, starting 
with the Supreme Court’s r
rter-Tellico dam case in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill in 
1978.132  Here, the Court held that Section 7 prohibited the 
completion of the Tellico dam on the Little Tennessee River because 
it would have jeopardized the snail darter, a three-inch perch listed by 
the FWS as endangered in 1975.  Writing for the majority, Chief 
Justice Burger reasoned that “[o]ne would be hard pressed to find a 
statutory prov
nd that “plain intent” is found “in literally every section of the 
ute” to “halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, 
tever the cost.”133  The message sent by TVA was not lost on t
ironmental community who have continued to use the ESA as
tical battering ram, legal monkeywrench, and “too
titutional disruption.”134
Though the ESA is full of “plain language,” it also has its share of 
vagueness and ambiguity.  Due to its original language and the 
subsequent amendments to the ESA, the FWS and Fisheries have 
significant managerial discretion in some areas.  The contentious 
issue of designating critical habitat provides a good example.  The 
1973 version of the ESA referenced it only once, directing federal 
agencies to  
[e]nsure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do 
not jeopardize the continued existence of... endangered species and 
threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of 
                                                        
131 See generally Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Ma INN. L. REV. 869, 872 (1997) (“Indeed, it might be said that the [ESA] 
is in trouble today not because it 
ual 
M  Association, March 15-17, 2001, Las  Vegas, 
N
nagement, 81 M
fails to address diversity and ecosystems, but instead 
because it is beginning to address them too well.”); JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, 
THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 117 (2002) (reviewing the 
“unparalleled stringency of the ESA’s provisions.”). 
132 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
133 Id. at 173. 
134 Christopher McGrory Klyza & David J. Sousa, Creating Chaos:  The Endangered 
Species Act and the Politics of Institutional Disruption (paper presented at the Ann
eeting of the Western Political Science
V) (on file with author). 
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Congress has also explicitly chosen to give these agencies more 
managerial discretion in Section 10(j) of the ESA,142 added in the 
19  of the Interior 
                                                       
 
habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after 
consultation as appropriate with the affected States, to be critical.135
Congress neither defined nor explained what was meant by these 
key terms in 1973, so the Secretary of the Interior had to 
t in various regulations and guidelines.136 Congress entered the fray 
again by providing additional qualifying and discretionary language 
in the ESA’s 1978 amendment.  The Secretary of the Interior is now 
able to designate critical habitat “to the maximum extent prudent and 
determinable.”137  Predictably, the parsing, determination, and 
designation of critical habitat has been politically agonizing.138  
According to Michael Bean and Melanie Rowland, “[i]t remains one 
of the Act’s most contentious, ambiguous, and confusing concepts . . . 
[with] no clear, consistent, a
 what role it is to play in the Act’s administration.”139 Moreover, 
“Congress has obscured, rather than clarified, the concept, and the 
courts . . . have never given more than superficial attention to the 
duties that arise from the designation of critical habitat.”140
This means that Congress and the courts have placed the USFWS 
and Fisheries at the center of the political conflicts over critical 
habitat designation.  How they have handled this responsibility has 
generally angered the environmental community.  For example, using 
the “maximum extent prudent and determinable” language, the 
Congressional Research Service found that the USFWS designated 
critical habitat for only about 10 percent of listed domestic species, 
and that the Agency lost every case brought against them for failure to 
designate critical habitat.141
82 amendments.  This provision gives the Secretary
 
A) (2000). 
135 Pub L. No. 93-205 § 7 (1973) (emphasis added). 
136 MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE LAW 251-62 (3d ed., 1997) (providing a history of the critical habitat issue). 
137 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(
138 See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation 
by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 297 (1993). 
139 BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 136, at 251. 
140 Id. at 252. 
141 M. Lynne Corn, Cong. Research Serv., Endangered Species:  Continuing 
Controversy (Issue Brief 1310009, Nov. 21, 2000) (with other cases pending, as of 1999) 
(the brief also states that in 1999 the FWS placed critical habitat designation at the lowest 
priority in its listing budget). 
142 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j). 




 we distinguish between the statute 
an
                                                       
the ability to list some endangered species as “experimental, non-
essential populations,” meaning that they can be managed as 
threatened instead of endangered.  To do so, various requirements 
need to be met, like having the experimental population “wholly 
separate geographically from nonexperimental populations of the 
same species.”143  This provision was added as a way to give the 
USFWS more latitude and flexibility in its management of 
endangered species.  It has done so, but it has also caused a gre
 controversy, as illustrated by the reintroduction of wolves into 
Yellowstone National Park and Idaho as experimental populations in 
the mid-1990s. 144  Some environmental groups argued that this 
provision as applied to wolves runs counter to the intent and 
obligations inherent in the ESA, and that the USFWS would simply 
use its discretion to appease ranchers.145  Others supporting the 
experimental designation argued that it provided the USFWS the 
managerial flexibility needed to maneuver in a complicated and 
divisive political environment and, that in the end, it is not the intent 
of the Act that matters most but its successful implementation. 
Assessing public land law in terms of legislative versus 
administrative control requires that
d its implementation.  This distinction between good or bad law and 
good or bad implementation is important, and is a distinction that runs 
through public land law in general.  With the ESA, Daniel Rohlf takes 
issue with the former and its administrative interpretation.146  Much of 
Daniel Rohlf’s criticism is directed at the “biological deficiencies” of 
the ESA.  For example, what constitutes in “danger of extinction?”  
The ESA “does not clearly define or specifically describe its security 
 
143 Id. § 1539(j)(1).  The meaning of this language was also contested during the 
reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone National Park.  The case eventually ended up in 
litigation as some environmental and wise use groups argued (unsuccessfully) that these 
re
.
lly MARTIN A. NIE, BEYOND WOLVES:  THE POLITICS OF WOLF 
RE
Welfare Ranching, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
10
Work—And What to Do About It, 5(3) CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 273 (1991). 
introduced wolf populations were not “wholly separate geographically” from another 
endangered wolf population in the region   See Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 987 F. 
Supp. 1349 (D.Wyo. 1997).  The Tenth Circuit disagreed and argued that Congress did not 
specify what it meant by “wholly separate geographically” and thus left its interpretation 
to the FWS.  It also reminded plaintiffs that Congress added section 10(j) as a way to 
provide additional flexibility and discretion in managing reintroduction efforts. See Wyo. 
Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d. 1224, 1234-36 (10th Cir. 2000). 
144 See genera
COVERY AND MANAGEMENT (2003). 
145 See Dale D. Goble, Of Wolves and 
1 (1992). 
146 See Daniel J. Rohlf, Six Biological Reasons Why the Endangered Species Act 
Doesn’t 
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standard” says Rohlf, meaning “the degree of security afforded to 
species by the Act varies according t
terminations by the services.”147
Other assessments focus more on the law’s implementation.148  
The ESA, says Michael O’Connell in a response to Rohlf’s critique, is 
a “remarkably prescient statute that has been plagued since its 
adoption by ineffective implementation.”149  The ESA is “sufficiently 
clear, uncomplicated and concise,” and its goals can b
litical will and adequate funding.150  The lack of the latter, he says, 
is largely the cause of the ESA’s deficiencies.  Steven Yaffee’s 
analysis also focuses on the highly prohibitive ESA being 
implemented in a nonprohibitive fashion.151
Most assessments of the ESA are subjective and situational.  
Groups will take issue with the vagueness of the statute when they 
believe it is not being implemented properly.  In othe
s a
might see flexibility rather than trouble in vagueness. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, the ESA also 
complicates the administrative versus legislative control debate.  
Congress, for example, would not be overly burdened by saying yes 
or no to snowmobiles in Yellowstone or by making similar policy 
choices.  But, determining when a species merits listing or delisting is 
an altogether different policy choice, and one that is often mired in 
scientific disagreement, complexity, and uncertainty.152
                                 
147 Id. at 27
148 ENDANG ROVING THE 
PR
151 See generally STEVEN L. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY:  IMPLEMENTING THE 
FE
ses, Effects, and Future of the Endangered 
Sp
6. 
ERED SPECIES RECOVERY:  FINDING THE LESSONS, IMP
OCESS (Tim W. Clark et al. eds., 1994). 
149 Michael O’Connell, Response to: “Six Biological Reasons Why the Endangered 
Species Act Doesn’t Work—And What to Do About It”, 6 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 140 
(1992). 
150 Id. at 142. 
DERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1982). 
152 See generally Holly Doremus, The Purpo
ecies Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004); Holly Doremus, 
Listing Decisions Under the Endandered Species Act:  Why Better Science Isn’t Always 
Better Policy, 75 WASH. U.L.Q. 1029 (1997); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND 
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1995) (evaluating the ESA and related policy debates in 
terms of contemporary scientific knowledge). 
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congressional delegation.156  While it might be unconstitutional for 
C uch responsibility to a federal agency 
   
II 
RETHINKING STATUTORY DETAIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION 
This part reviews the political and philosophical debate over 
congressional delegation of authority and agency discretion as it 
applies to public lands-based political conflict.  Do agencies like the 
USFS and NPS have too much discretion?  Are they legitimate 
arbiters of competing claims to public lands?  What might happen if 
Congress reasserted itself and provided more prescription, detail, and 
guidance in new legislation?  Some of the central arguments reviewed 
in the case for and against administrative leadership and discretion 
qualify my argument for providing more statutory detail in the 
following section. 
A.  Administrative Leadership and Discretion 
Article IV, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution states: “The Congress 
shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and 
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so 
construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any 
particular state.”153  The federal government has proprietary and 
sovereign powers over its property (including public lands) and may 
regulate activity on private lands that affect its public lands.  The 
Property Clause has been debated between those advocating a broad 
or 154 narrow view of its powers.   But, the courts have been rather 
consistent in their reading of its scope and importance, going so far as 
to say that this congressional power over public lands is “without 
limitations.”155
The Property Clause changes things for some critics of 
ongress to delegate too m
                                                     
153 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2. 
154 See generally Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”:  The 
Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property,  86 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2001) 
(reviewing the history and potential of the Property Clause). 
155 United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940).  See also Kleppe v. New 
Mexico 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976) (describing Congress’s broad powers under the 
Property Clause). 
156 Delegation critic David Schoenbrod makes an exception for the management of 
government property.  See David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court 
Give it Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1226, 1265-72 (1985); DAVID SCHOENBROD, 
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:  HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH 
DELEGATION 186-89 (1993). 
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regulating private behavior, it has much more latitude when it does so 
concerning its own public lands.  The executive acts as both 
proprietor and sovereign when executing delegated Property Clause 
powers.  As noted by Sandra Zellmer, this means that “property 
management is not necessarily analogous to other types of 
lawmaking, and more leeway might be afforded executive agencies, 
acting not only as instrumen
oprietors, when public property is implicated.”157  She also notes 
that courts have regularly cited this executive role as proprietor in 
ratifying sweeping exercises of power and that the broadly p
ional Forest Organic Act of 1897 was upheld by the Suprem
rt against a nondelegation challenge.158
t is also possible to view public administration as anoth
ocratic check and balance.  Administrative leaders can make su
 laws and democratic principles are adhered to, especially wh
 are being threatened by presidential and congressional power
159  They are not mere pawns according to this view; rather, 
they are democratic trustees empowered with the public’s interest.  
They can advance this interest by implementing laws Congress 
intended, and if such laws are being threatened by the President or by 
members of Congress, they have the responsibility to inform the 
public.  They will in essence say: if you want us to do that, you need 
to first pass a law saying so. 
Administrative leadership can take other forms as well.  Former 
bor Secretary Robert Reich believes that higher-level public 
managers ought to stimulate public debate about what they do: 
Public deliberation can help the manager clarify ambiguous 
mandates.  More importantly, it can help the public discover latent 
contradictions and commonalities in what it wants to achieve.  Thus 
the public manager’s job is not only, or simply, to make policy 
choices and implement them.  It is also to participate in a system of 
 
157 Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century 
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal,  32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 1025 (2000). 
158 Id. at 1025-26.  See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). 
159 H. George Frederickson & David K. Hart, The Public Service and the Patriotism of 
Benevolence, 45 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 547-53 (1985) (discussing the role of public 
administration as a check on power, with an example of resistance by Danish civil servants 
to Nazi leaders during WWII German occupation). See also MICHAEL W. SPICER, THE 
FOUNDERS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:  A CONFLICT IN 
WORLDVIEWS 69-70 (1995) (discussing visions and worldviews of public administration 
from an American Constitutional perspective). 




democratic governance in which public values are continuously 
rearticulated and recreated.160
This is how Reich approaches the administrative discretion-
democratic values challenge: public managers use this discretionary 
space or “running room” to engage the public in democratic 
deliberation about what it wants in a type of “civic discovery.”161
Administrative management, especially when channeled through 
rulemaking processes, can be more democratic and participatory than 
other forms of democratic decision making.162  Democracy, after all, 
is a contested concept.163  Administrative control might satisfy some 
conceptions of democracy, and fail others, but the same goes for 
legislative (representative) control.164  The administrative ru
ocess, as outlined in the 1946 Administrative Procedures Act,165 is 
integral to this case.  It provides substantive opportunities for public 
participation—opportunities that are quite rare in legislative 
                                                        
160 Robert B. Reich, Policy Making in a Democracy, in THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS 
123-24 (Robert B. Reich ed., 1988). 
161 Id. at 144-47. 
162 A rule according to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) “means the whole or 
part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed 
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000).  There are 
three important elements of rulemaking.  First, information must be provided to the public 
in the form of a notice that is published in the Federal Register.  Generally, the agency 
tells the public what it is proposing to do, under what authority and
the time of the rulemaking period.  Once the decision has been made, the agency is to also
 statute it is acting, and 
 
issue a general statement of the rule’s basis and purpose.  Second, the participation 
requirement mandates that agencies give the public “an opportunity to participate in the 
 drive for delegation, from the beginning of the twentieth 
cen vernment’s accountability to ordinary voters.”  
Id
S.C. § 551 (2000). 
rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without 
opportunity for oral presentation.”  Finally, accountability is an important element of 
rulemaking and is most explicit in the possibility of judicial review.  The reviewing court 
can hold unlawful and set aside an agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, and 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  For an extended analysis of 
rulemaking and accountability, see CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING (1994). 
163 ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (1998) (exploring democracy in the ideal and 
in practice and the underlying conditions favoring and harming democracy). 
164 Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795, 803-04 
(1999) (arguing that democracy is an empty standard for evaluating the desirability and 
constitutionality of delegation:  “Any argument that critiques delegation based on one 
conception of democracy will be answerable by an argument that defends delegation based 
on some other conception of democracy.”).  But see David Schoenbrod, Delegation and 
Democracy:  A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731 (1999).  Responding to 
Kahan, Schoenbrod notes that “[t]he effort to square delegation with democracy is 
pervasively futile because the
tury, stemmed from a desire to reduce go
. at 732. 
165 5 U.
254 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 19(2), 2004] 
 
pr






are ounded in a system in which citizens can trust that 
ru
                                                       
oceedings.  Furthermore, as opposed to vague legislation, the public 
has a chance to comment on specifics in rulemaking so that they are 
much more certain of how policy may affect them.  Thus, it is easier 
to formulate meaningful positions.  From an interest group standpoint, 
rulemaking can also be a very effective organizing tool because rules 
are so specific and thus, provide a focal point of the debate. 
The rulemaking process is also a way to limit the power and 
discretion of bureaucrats.  According to Co
limits on the authority of public officials in all areas of their wo
tifying what they can know, how they can learn it, when th
t act, what they must do, when they must do it, and actions the
 take against those who fail to comply.”166 Thus, “[f]ears 
ttered discretion in the hands of willful or ignorant bureaucr
largely unf
lemaking will occur subsequent to any legislative enactment and set 
effective and reasonable limits on the use of otherwise discretionary 
power.”167  Rulemaking, in short, provides a way to ensure that 
agency actions are not “arbitrary and capricious.”168
Accountability is an essential part of this debate,169 but there is no 
agreed upon notion of what it means exactly.170  According to some 
 
policy and political 
dis
cy.” Id. 
166 KERWIN, supra note 162, at 31. 
167 Id. 
168 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2000) (discussing scope of review in the APA). 
169 See generally KERWIN, supra note 162, at 215 (providing a comprehensive review 
of executive, legislative, and judicial oversight of rulemaking). 
170 Edward P. Weber, The Question of Accountability in Historical Perspective:  From 
Jackson to Contemporary Grassroots Ecosystem Management, 31 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 453, 
480 (1999).  Applying the concept of accountability to the move toward “grassroots 
ecosystem management.” In the end, the whole idea of accountability is as fluid and 
contextual as that of democracy.  Weber traces our changing expectations and 
understanding of the accountability concept.  What Weber finds is that “[e]ach 
conceptualization emphasizes different institutions and locates the ultimate authority for 
accountability in differing combinations and types of sectors (public, private, 
intermediary), processes, decision rules, knowledge, and values.”  The eighteenth century 
Jacksonian model, for example, emphasized bottom-up and mass-based political parties 
and intermediary associations while the “public-interest-egalitarian” model focused more 
on centralized federal control and broader participation in bureaucratic decision making.  
The point is that accountability means different things to progressive-era New Dealers  
than it does to “neo-conservative, efficiency” types.  While submitting “that an acceptable 
system of democratic accountability can take a variety of forms rather than adhering to 
some sacrosanct, overarching notion of accountability,” Weber also concludes that each 
mo stitution as the preeminent authority in del “relies on the Con
putes” and that “[e]ach pays homage to the electoral connection between citizens and 
representatives and to the corollary primacy of elected officials over the bureaucracy as 
fundamental sources of legitimacy for American democra









critics who think there is too much congressional delegation, 
bureaucrats are largely unaccountable because they are not elected.171  
But others argue that public officials with delegated decision making
wers are appointed by an elected President.172  The case frequently 
cited here is Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., in which the Court stated that: 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of 
the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the 
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did 
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency 
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday 
realities.173
This argument is straightforward: if Congress provides detail, end 
of story.  But, if Congress leaves legislation general and vague, then it 
has in effect, deferred to the executive branch, and this branch is 
controlled by the President.  In other words, delegation of power to 
administrators can in fact improve governmental responsiveness 
because Presidents are elected and heads of administrations.   In 
short, according to this view, presidential control of agency decision 
making provides democratic accountability through the ballot box.175
Defenders of administrative control also argue that legislative 
oversight of agencies provides another layer of accountability.  This 
oversight happens in numerous ways.176  First of course, Congress 
could control agency y writing more detailed legislation.  
echanism.  Congress often sends messages to agencies through the 
appropriations process.  The agencies are accountable because they 
are not self-financing.  Other methods include using de
agency action; “hammer provisions” written into statutes that will 
                                                        
171 See infra Part III.B. 
172 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:  Why Administrators Should Make 
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985). 
173 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984). 
174 Mashaw, supra note 172, at 95. 
175 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power:  A Response to 
Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 407-08 (1987) (discussing the capabilities of the 
executive branch as it applies to delegation and democratic accountability). 
176 The legislative veto, struck down by the Supreme Court in Immigration and 
N
ency rulemaking.  Veto provisions were 
w
aturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), provided what was perhaps the 
strongest type of Congressional control over ag
ritten into statutes requiring agencies to submit proposed rules for congressional review 
and approval. 
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 rigid, inflexible, and “ossified” rulemaking process.178  
In
take effect if an agency fails to do what Congress wants it to; 
oversight and program reauthorization hearings; staff investigations 
and field studies; communication with agency personnel; casework 
review; agency reports required by Congress; and program 
evaluations done by agencies, committee staff, and nongovernmental 
personnel.177
The problem with such oversight, though, is that it has led to an 
increasingly
stead of stepping forth and tackling the controversial policy issues 
of the day, Congress instead tries to control the decisions public land 
agencies make by forcing them to go through dozens of procedural 
and analytical steps.179  And, if this fails to work, it uses the 
appropriations process to get what it wants.  These procedural 
provisions are sometimes designed to thwart the legislative mandates 
agencies must implement.180  And, if this was not enough, Congress 
                                                        
177 See generally JAMES R. BOWERS, REGULATING THE REGULATORS (1990); JOEL D. 
ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE:  THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
132 (1990).  Such oversight could be categorized as “police patrol” or of the “fire alarm” 
variety. The former is more proactive in nature, while the latter is set off by a disgruntled 
constituent or interest group, See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 165-79 (1984). 
178 See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on ‘Deossifying’ the 






oceedings and has produced an enormous superstructure of 




Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992) 
179 Congress has imposed a number of analytical requirements, like having agencies go 
through the EIS process and prepare analyses required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 
all in an effort to exercise control over agency decision making.  Add on top of this a 
number of analytical requirements imposed by the White House.  These are often issued in 
the form of Executive Orders mandating agencies to conduct such things as regulatory 
impact analyses and to evaluate rules in terms of private property rights, trade, and 
federalism, among other things.  Another layer consists of scientific review requirements 
that agencies use to solicit outside expertise and to peer review scientific and technical 
rules.  Once these analytical requirements are met, they are then subject to congressional, 
judicial, and executive review.  President Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291, for example, 
requires that agencies submit all rules to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for 
review so that they are in compliance with the Order’s cost-benefit analytical 
requirements.  Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 1
other layer of review came with President Bush’s Council of Competitiveness.  These
 of how the executive competes with Congress for control over agency 
ision making.  According to McGarity’s analysis, ossification results from thes
uirements and reviews.  McGarity, supra note 178. 
180 See GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION 3 (1987).  Bryner asserts that: 
[t]he broad scope of administrative power has invited political inter
administrative pr
procedural mechanisms designed to create 
administrative government, which fails to limit and direct administrative power and
threatens the ability of agencies to accomplish their statutory mandates
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then often complains about the bureaucratic red tape, paperwork, and 
inefficiencies resulting from such processes.181  This is not to suggest 
that these steps are not beneficial, but that there is a more legitimate 
way of controlling administrative discretion—by making choices in 
legislation. 
The federal judiciary provides the most obvious form of 
administrative oversight.  It makes sure that agencies behave legally, 
and that they follow substantive and procedural rules.  Two questions 
are asked: is this rule or action permissible under the agency’s 
congressional mission, mandate, and authorizing legislation?  And, 
did the agency follow the appropriate procedures in carrying out this 
rule or action?  The mere existence 
igation affects bureaucratic behavior through the law of anticipated 
reaction.182  But, when cases are brought before them, courts often 
look to the important provisions of the APA.  The APA directs the 
reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law183 
[and/or] in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or 
short of statutory right.”184  Predictably, courts give different meaning 
to this language.  Some adopt a “hard look” standard in which they 
are quite searching, skeptical, vigilant, and aggressive in their review 
of agency rulemaking.185  They will scrutinize agency decisions and 
play a more active role in the process.  But, the more dominant view 
is much less likely to intervene in agency rulemaking, seeing it as 
judicial usurpation of agency discretion.186  As long as agencies stay 
within their statutory mandates and do not egregiously mess up 
procedures, courts adopting this view will generally give the agency 
the benefit of the doubt.187  Thus, one view grants great latitude to the 
judiciary, while the other to agencies. 
 
Id. 
l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
A
181 See generally Bosworth, supra note 47. 
182 See generally PAUL J. CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS POLITICS (1981). 
183 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2000). 
184 Id. § 706(2)(c). 
185 See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
186 See, e.g., Chevron v. Natura
187 See Vic Sher, Breaking Out of the Box:  Toxic Risk, Government Actions, and 
Constitutional Rights, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 145 (1998) (analyzing the limitations of 
litigating under the extremely deferential standard set forth in the PA). 
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islation.  In 
oth
For purposes here, it is enough to point out the real and potential 
role of the judiciar
t while judicial oversight is an essential feature of the checks and 
balances system, the courtroom is not the most appropriate venue for 
resolving some political conflicts.  However, given the amount of 
administrative discretion provided to public land agencies and our 
hyperpluralistic and litigious political culture, the courts have become 
dominant players in public lands governance.188  In many ways, the 
often cited “iron triangle” comprised of private interests, agencies, 
and congressional committees has been replaced by a “judicial iron 
triangle” because of the important role judges play in the process.189  
There is a dominant sequence in public lands politics: (1) vague, 
ambiguous or contradictory laws leave many 
estions unanswered; (2) land management agencies try to answer 
these questions using the less-than-perfect administrative rulemaking 
process; (3) they are sued; (4) courts implicitly or explicitly answer 
the political questions avoided by Congress; (5) depending on the 
court’s interpretation, they are either championed as guardians of 
democracy or vilified as judicial activists.  This recurring pattern 
raises an important question of when judicial oversight becomes 
judicial control.190
It is also important to consider whether or not the hyper-complex 
nature of social and ecological systems precludes Congress from 
providing any meaningful detail and specificity in leg
er words, might the complexity of environmental problems 
necessarily lead to Congress delegating authority to resource 
professionals and scientific experts in federal agencies?  If so, it 
would be unwise to provide too much detail and prescription in such a 
complex and rapidly changing environment.  This argument is well 
worn and found its most forceful articulation in the Progressive Era: 
                                                        
188 See generally GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND 
RESOURCES LAW (5th ed. 2002). 
189 Jeanne Nienaber Clarke & Kurt Angersbach, The Federal Four:  Change and 
Continuity in the Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, Forest Service, 
ECREE   
litigation”). 
and National Park Service, 1970-2000, in WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 35 (Charles Davis, ed., 2001). 
190 See generally ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY D :
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003) (analyzing how courts came 
to govern various policy areas and the growth of “institutional reform 
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practiced, the science of adaptive 
ma
the tedious and uncertain nature of congressional policymaking?  It 
would be unrealistic to expect Congress to provide this sort of 
m
 it is also necessary to 
as e 
mo
    
 
that the science of conservation must be left to the professionally 
trained and apolitical experts in federal agencies.191
It is worth asking, however, if many of our controversial resource 
decisions are all that technical and complex.  Should snowmobiles be 
allowed in Yellowstone?  Should we ban road construction (with 
permissible exemptions and mitigations) in inventoried roadless 
areas?  Should we allow d
cky Mountain Front?  These are value and interest-based political 
questions, not technical ones.  Surely there is a level of complexity 
involved, but the core questions are hardly beyond the grasp of our 
elected representatives.  Nonetheless, there are questions and is
t would challenge any national representative body, such as the 
scientific complexities surrounding the ESA illustrate.192
A case can also be made—at lease in theory—that increased 
administrative control is more conducive to adaptation and flexibility.  
Rulemaking, process, and litigation notwithstanding, agencies might 
be better positioned than Congress to adapt to the changing and site-
specific contexts, problems, and goals of public lands management.  
Though preached more than 
nagement necessitates agency flexibility.  This means that policies 
and management decisions are experiments that we learn from.  
Practitioners are explicit in what they expect: information is collected 
and analyzed so that expectations can be compared to the actuality; 
then finally, they correct errors, learn, and change actions and 
plans.193  Might the principles of adaptive management be inimical to 
icromanagement, or to have it vote various management decisions 
up or down along the way.  On the other hand,
k if the theory of adaptive management is even possible in th
dern administrative state. 
                                                    
191 See generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY
ESSIVE
:  
 CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959). THE PROGR
192 See supra Part II. 
193 See KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE:  INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND 
POLITICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 9 (1993).  Lee comments: 
I have come to think of science and democracy as compass and gyroscope—
navigational aids in the quest for sustainability.  Science linked to human purpose is 
a compass: a way to gauge directions when sailing beyond the maps.  Democracy, 
with its contentious stability, is a gyroscope:  a way to maintain our bearing through 
turbulent seas. 
Id. at 5-6. 
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 control.  The demands on 
Co
bstantive policy riders onto appropriations bills.  Instead of 
building a majority to support their policy goals, rider provisions 
allow repres  
om
                       
Differences between theory and practice are also important when 
thinking about alternatives to administrative
ngress often exceed its institutional capacity, and finding 
agreement, even a slim majority, in this body is usually difficult. 
Given this reality, one possibility is that if Congress could not 
delegate authority to agencies in providing detail and specificity, it 
would subdelegate this responsibility to congressional committees or 
subcommittees.  For Richard Stewart, such subdelegation to 
subcommittees raises accountability concerns because it shifts power 
to senior committee chairs and staff, and their interest group allies.  
“Policy is made through a submerged micropolitical process without 
open and regular procedures.”194
Congress might also provide this necessary statutory detail by 
tacking su
entatives to bury the detail in other voluminous (often
nibus) bills.195  Since such appropriations bills have to pass each 
year to keep the government working, they provide an opportune 
vehicle for representatives who are unwilling or unable to forward 
policy through more traditional processes. 
This illustrates why it is so important to contrast the agency 
rulemaking process to the real way policy is often made in Congress.  
The procedural and participatory requirements of federal rulemaking 
can be more regular, predictable, open, responsive, transparent, and 
democratic than some questionable legislative practices.  As Stewart 
notes, unlike rulemaking, subdelegated congressional decision 
making is often not subject to public input through regularly 
established procedures, not required to be based on a public record, 
and not subject to “hard look” judicial review.196  In sum, if we are 
going to debate the case for and against statutory detail and 




generally  of 
Appropriations Riders:  A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457 (1997) 
(arguing that the appropriations process is not a suitable way to formulate major changes 
in riorities); Linda M. Bolduan, The Hatfield Riders: 
El
wart, supra note 194, at 333. 
Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 
7). 
The use of appropriations riders in natural resource policy is alarming.  See 
 Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar
 policy and for establishing national p
iminating the Role of the Courts in Environmental Decision Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 329 
(1990) (examining the use of riders to exempt various forest management actions from 
judicial review). 
196 Ste
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adm d 
prac
atutory law is the 
mo
 according to Lowi: “modern law has become a series 
of
                                                       
 
inistrative discretion, let us compare these venues in theory an
tice. 
B.  The Case for Additional Statutory Detail 
Many of the above arguments should give us pause before 
demanding a more active role for Congress in public lands 
management.  There are serious limits on what Congress can do in 
this area, and a legislative “fix” might make things worse.  But, the 
following discussion also shows the limits of administrative 
leadership and discretion when it comes to public lands conflict 
resolution.  Good law, after all, is essential for a representative 
democracy.  As noted by Theodore Lowi, a persistent and often cited 
critic of administrative control and its “constitutional derangements:”  
“Policy without law is what a broad delegation of power is.”197  The 
rise of administrative law and the decline of good st
st troublesome development for Lowi, who sees “[t]he move from 
concreteness to abstractness in the definition of public policy [as] 
probably the most important single change in the entire history of 
public control in the United States.”198  Laws change the rules of the 
game, says Lowi: 
A good clear statute puts the government on one side as opposed to 
other sides, it redistributes advantages and disadvantages, it slants 
and redefines the terms of bargaining.  It can even eliminate 
bargaining, as this term is currently defined.  Laws set priorities.  
Laws deliberately set some goals and values above others.199
The broad delegation of power runs contrary to this rule of law, 
and “has wrapped public policies in shrouds of illegitimacy and 
ineffectiveness.”200  A good clear law will eliminate politics at certain 
points.  Vague, meaningless law, in contrast, politicizes the entire 
policymaking process from Congress to the low-level agency 
representatives who endlessly negotiate with agency “clients.”  The 
problem is clear
 instructions to administrators rather than a series of commands to 
 
E J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM:  THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE 
UN .  For the importance of Lowi’s work and the impression 
it . Lowi and Juridical Democracy, 23 PS:  POL. SCI. & POL. 563 
(1
a note 197, at 100. 
197 THEODOR
ITED STATES 93 (2d ed., 1979)
made, see Theodore J
990). 
198 LOWI, supr
199 Id. at 92. 
200 Id. at 93. 
262 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 19(2), 2004] 
 
ment from a 
mo
e responsibilities.206  First, he notes that Congress 
ro
citizens.”201  Juridical democracy—the rule of law operating in 
institutions—is put forth by Lowi as the fix to this problem.202  The 
principle on which it stands is quite clear: “the institutions of 
government ought to say what they are going to do to us before they 
do it; and if they cannot say they cannot act.”203
Process and public participation is also not a substitute for good 
law.  Calling for more process and interest representation is an easy 
out for political representatives who are responsible for making tough 
choices.  For Lowi, the representation focus—including the “new halo 
words” of cooperation, partnership, local option, creative federalism, 
community action and participatory democracy—is a “pathological 
adjustment to the problem,” and converts govern
ralistic to a mechanistic institution.204  The use of public 
participation in the rulemaking process is also a rather weak proxy for 
authentic democratic decision making.  That argument is very 
relevant to the collaborative conservation movement and the 
increasing use of public participation in agency decision making.205  
Instead of our political representatives taking responsibility for the 
tough choices that must be made, they can pass them along to 
agencies who in turn pass them along to their “clients” or other self-
selected stakeholders who are only accountable to the special interests 
they represent. 
For critics, this is yet another pathology of interest group liberalism 
that does not meet the public interest.  Law Professor George 
Coggins, for example, is emphatic that the devolution and 
collaborative movement is an abdication of congressional, judicial, 
and executiv
utinely ducks the hard allocation questions by delegating nearly 
standardless management powers to the USFS and BLM.207  Then, 
judges abdicate their judicial function by deferring to an agency’s 
choices and interpretations.  And now, bureaucrats are passing the 
                                                        
201 Id. at 106. 
202 Id. at 298. 




203 Id. at 299. 
204 Id. at 62. 
205 See generally THOMAS C. BEIERLE & JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE:  
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS (2002). 
206 George Cameron Coggins, Regu
se Against Devolved Collaboration, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 602 (1999). 
207 See George Cameron Coggins, Of Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: 
The Meaning of “Multiple Use, Sustained Yield” for Public Land Management, 5
COLO. L. REV. 229, 230 (1981). 
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narrow delegation, and 
us
retary and BLM should go about making 
de
buck on controversial issues to devolved collaborative groups.  So 
what should happen according to Coggins?  “All interests will be 
better off if Congress actually decides the political resource allocation 
questions, the executive carries out the letter and spirit of the law, and 
the courts make sure the executive does just that.”208
We must also not be fooled by lengthy laws, which simply delegate 
in great detail while failing to address central policy choices.  David 
Schoenbrod, another prominent critic of too much congressional 
delegation, argues that most delegating statutes do not “simply pass 
the buck but rather passes it along with complicated instructions.”209  
He makes a distinction between broad and 
es the Clean Air Act of 1970 as an example of the latter.  This law, 
says Schoenbrod, simply delegates in a new way by giving the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) “elaborate instructions 
about the goals that it should achieve and the procedures for 
promulgating them.”210  Narrow delegation is also evident in public 
lands law.  FLPMA, for example, articulates general principles of 
multiple use management, while providing very specific instructions 
in how the Interior Sec
cisions.211
Narrow delegation can often be identified by its goal and 
instruction-oriented design.  This allows political representatives to 
stand behind the principle of clean air, for instance, then go a step 
further by agreeing to an emissions reduction target, and then 
specifying what steps and procedures the EPA must use to achieve 
this goal.  But, the hard choices of how to achieve those emissions 
reductions and regulate various sources of pollution were delegated to 
the EPA and left to the states.  Schoenbrod also argues that narrow 
delegation has “the perverse side-effect of delaying, complicating, 
and rigidifying the process of making environmental laws.”212  But 
why make agencies jump through so many hoops in meeting these 
goals?  “[C]omplicated instructions often serve to camouflage the 
buck passing because legislators can hardly claim credit for solving a 
problem when the statute hands the problem to an agency without 
                                                        
208 Coggins, supra note 206, at 610. 
209 David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The 
Co ctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 355, 367 (1987). nstitutional Purposes of the Delegation Do
210 SCHOENBROD, supra note 156, at 58. 
211 See 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000). 
212 SCHOENBROD, supra note 156, at 59. 
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sum politicians off the hook—they can promise 
ev
[a]s is common in other contexts, Congress has said one thing about 
species protection yet actually done another.  The Act makes 
reserve biodiversity but transfers 
 
ying more[, and it] obscures the legislative mandate requiring 
agencies to reconcile irreconcilable goals.”213
The goal-based statutes governing the 
vant to this case.  Those laws generally state goals, which of
flict, and then delegate the job of reconciling those conflicts 
ncies.214  In MUSYA and NFMA, for example, Congress ca
d behind the vague goal of multiple use without having to decid
 to balance outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and fi
 wildlife values.  The tough and politically risky decisions 
in left to the agency. 
n the case for more statutory detail, it is made explicit th
gress is currently abdicating its responsibilities to make the tough 
ices and necessary trade-offs required of it.  Congress 
promising through statutory vagueness.  Congress leaves law
ue to please interested parties or leads those parties to believe th
 can get what they want by following the applicable process.  In 
, delegation gets 
erything to everyone, and when promises go unfulfilled they have a 
convenient bureaucratic scapegoat.  Self-interested political 
representatives have learned that taking sides on policy issues creates 
political opposition and entails real costs and risks.  Delegation thus 
encourages Congress to enact unnecessarily ambiguous or 
contradictory laws.  It encourages bad laws, says Schoenbrod, 
because “members of Congress do not have to take responsibility for 
the rules of conduct that eventually emerge from the delegation 
process.  So long as delegation allows politicians to enact laws that 
promise all things to all people, exhorting them to delegate in a 
different way is spitting into the wind.”215
Daniel Rohlf makes that argument in his critique of the ESA.  He 
sees strengthening this statute as an uphill battle given what the 
current text now gives lawmakers.  He says, 
general commitments to p
important policy decisions to those not directly accountable to the 
electorate.  This permits politicians to point to their solid 
environmental voting record while at the same time pressuring 
administrative agencies responsible for implementing the Act not to 
                                                        
213 Schoenbrod, supra note 209, at 368. 
214 See generally David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It 
Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (1985). 
215 Schoenbrod, supra note 209, at 370. 
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make decisions that significantly curtail economic activities, 
particularly in their districts.  Reduced protections for biodiversity 
are then passed off as “science” rather than conscious, politically 
driven policy choices . . . .  Conservation biologists and others need 
to redouble their efforts to impress upon elected officials and the 
public the worth of saving imperiled species.  However, until policy 
decisions—the degree of security to give listed species, for 
example—are taken away from administrative agencies and given 
to politically accountable decision-makers, such efforts will have 
limited influence.216
A similar logic can be applied to the case of multiple use.  Here, 
we have a situation in which congressional members lend rhetorical 
support for this broad mandate while historically acting on behalf of 
organized special interests.217
These critiques rely heavily upon the notion of Congressional 
“credit claiming.”  As “single-minded seekers of reelection,” 
Congress members engage in certain types of behavior that will help 
them achieve that goal.218  This includes advertising a favorable 
image to constituents (one often devoid of content), partaking in 
constituent casework (with favors being returned), taking strategic 
positions on issues, and then claiming credit for various political 
accomplishments.  The latter is often done by particularizing benefits 
or the practice of concentrating rewards and dispersing costs. 
For those subscribing to this view, delegation provides the perfect 
vehicle for self-interested congressional members.  They can vote on 
some vague law, claim credit for doing something, and then follow it 
with a targeted advertising campaign.  Of course, the law will be 
vague enough that bureaucrats will have to answer the toughest 
questions and make the hardest choices.  Because of this, members 
can work quietly behind the scenes influencing agency behavior and 
doing more casework.  In sum, it gives politicians a way to dodge the 
trade-offs and instead, talk about fuzzy ideological abstractions, 
                                                     
216 Rohlf, supra note 146, at 280. 
217 See Blumm, supra note 11.  Blumm argues that “public choice theory supports the 
proposition that multiple use cannot fulfill its promise because it is inherently biased 
toward commodity users” and that “[s]ince multiple use is founded upon a standardless 
delegation of authority to managers of public lands and waters, congressional endorsement 
of multiple use has created the archetypal ‘special interest’ legislation.”  Id. at 405, 407. 
218 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS:  THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION, Ch. 1 (1974).  
But see Steven Kelman, Why Public Ideas Matter, in THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS 31 
(Robert B. Reich, ed., 1988).  Taking issue with the public choice explanation of all 
congressional behavior and arguing that as a general rule, “self-interest becomes a less 
powerful influence as the importance of a policy choice increases.”  Id. at 39. 
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ntation emphasizes the importance of precision, 
cle
byzantine rulemaking and 
pla
    
values, and goals that are broad enough to catch favorable political 
winds. 
Relatively clear, understandable, and unambiguous law is also an 
important factor necessary for effective policy implementation (along 
with budgets, political support, etc.).  Much of the scholarly literature 
focusing on impleme
ar policy goals, and the ranking of statutory objectives.219  Of 
course, without such goals and objectives in place, it is impossible to 
judge whether or not the agency in question is achieving them.  And, 
without some type of prioritizing of objectives, including an 
indication of how statutes are supposed to work together, new 
directives may be given low priority or become lost in the shuffle.220  
This certainly makes intuitive sense and takes some heat off of our 
public land agencies.  The remedy here is also simple: write clearer 
statutes and expect relatively better implementation. 
Excessive administrative control using 
nning processes might also lead to increased political alienation 
among citizens.  Schoenbrod believes that delegation is partially 
responsible for voter apathy, alienation, and the sense held among 
many people that our political system is often impervious to public 
direction.  With delegation, he says, “lawmaking even on the most 
controversial subjects becomes, for most of us, an incomprehensible 
bore.”221  Why should voters invest the time and energy to become 
knowledgeable about the policy positions of candidates if the most 
important decisions are not made legislatively but rather through 
some labyrinthine rulemaking process?  Furthermore, why participate 
in a time-intensive process when public comment may not matter all 
that much anyway? 
                                                    
219 See generally Donald S. Van Meter & Carl E. Van Horn, The Policy Implementation 
Process: A Conceptual Framework, 6 ADMIN. & SOCIETY 445 (1975) (discussing the 
importance of policy objectives and standards); ROBERT T. NAKAMURA & FRANK 
SMALLWOOD, THE POLITICS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 33 (1980) (discussing the 
importance of clarity in policy instructions and directives, meaning being specific about 
what is to be achieved and how); GEORGE C. EDWARDS, IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY 
10 (1980) (stating that “[f]or implementation to be effective, those whose responsibility it 
is to implement a decision must know what they are supposed to do.”). 
220 See Paul Sabatier & Daniel Mazmanian, The Implementation of Public Policy:  A 
Framework of Analysis, 8 POL’Y STUD. J. 538, 545 (1980) (“In short, to the extent that a 
statute provides precise and clearly ranked instructions to implementing officials and other 
actors . . . the more likely that the policy outputs of the implementing agencies and 
ultimately the behavior of target groups will be consistent with those directives.”). 
221 SCHOENBROD, supra note 156, at 20. 
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 have those decisions been made 
an
course and gives different meaning to multiple use and forest health?  
P
mble 
majorities and rewrite laws than it is for an agency to promulgate new 
ru
m
icy of federal lands 
m
Communities and industries that are particularly dependent on 
public lands might also find a degree of predictability in increased 
statutory detail.  One of the most enduring questions in public lands 
conflict is what obligation our land agencies have in providing 
community stability and economic development.  Should our national 
forests, for example, be managed in a way to benefit local timber 
industries and communities?  And should our national parks be 
managed for the “gateway communities” that become economically 
dependent upon them?  If so, where
d have they been codified by Congress? 
The volatility surrounding public lands politics is at least one 
disincentive for industries and communities to rely too heavily on the 
public domain.  In forest policy, for example, uncertainty resulting 
from litigation, administrative appeals, and changing administrative 
priorities—all partially stemming from legislative language issues—
leaves some interests unwilling to make serious investments and long-
term plans.  Why, for instance, invest in new technology capable of 
handling small diameter trees if the next administration changes 
roviding a new level of statutory detail might help things, then, 
partly because it is so much harder for Congress to reasse
les. 
This argument can also be taken too far however.  With national 
forests, for instance, securing community stability and predictability 
ight be but a pipedream.  There are simply too many factors 
complicating these goals, including the unpredictable nature of fire, 
insect outbreaks and disease, new scientific knowledge, swings in 
public opinion, drought, climate change, agency budgets and 
congressional appropriations, market demand, housing starts, and 
globalized timber markets, to name a few.  For former USFS Chief 
Jack Ward Thomas, “[g]iven the myriad of interacting variables, it is 
time for concerned citizens and leaders to accept the reality that the 
dream of a stable timber supply from public lands is an illusion.”222  
But, predictability could be increased, he says, in part by Congress 
dealing squarely with the issue of biodiversity protection, which he 
believes has become the overriding de facto pol
anagement.223  If that is our policy, he says, “it should be clearly 
                                                        
222 Jack Ward Thomas, Stability and Predictability in Federal Forest Management:  
Some Thoughts from the Chief, 17 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 9, 14 (1996). 
223 Id. at 15. 
268 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 19(2), 2004] 
th forests, and other 
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stated, recognized openly, and the consequences accepted.  If 
biodiversity protection is not a desired national policy, that should 
also be stated.  A clear declaration of policy regarding biodiversity is 
one key to the ‘stability’ debate.”224
There is a widespread assumption that national forest management 
ought to promote community stability and economic development.225  
This belief has influenced USFS policies and has certainly been a 
common theme in conflicts over owls, old grow
ues.  But, there exists little explicit statutory guidance on how large 
a role it should play in USFS decision making.226  NFMA provides 
some direction here,227 but much of this emphasis on community 
stability stemmed from USFS planning regulations, like the one 
calling for the maximization of net public benefits228 and the 
consideration of public comment (much of it coming from these 
communities).  But while planning regulations call for its 
consideration, there is very limited explicit statutory authority to do 
so.  Of course, Congress has said a number of things about this matter 
over the years (in the Congressional Record, during floor debate, and 
in other places), but it has not been explicit where this goal ranks in 
                                                        
224 Id. 
225 See generally Hearing on Impact of Federal Land Use Policies on Rural 
Communities, Hearing Before the House Committee on R th
(19
esources, 105  Cong. 2d sess. 
American Foresters National Task Force on Co
au
 or achieve 
su nd “are consistent with the 
ob 6 U.S.C. § 472a(e)(1)(C), (D) (2000). 
98). 
226 See Con H. Schallau & Richard M. Alston, The Commitment to Community 
Stability:  A Policy or Shibboleth, 17 ENVTL. L. 429 (1987).  Noting that “[p]ublic land 
legislation contains a general theme of concern for the economic stability of communities.  
However, there is little explicit statutory direction on how large a role community stability 
concerns should play in Forest Service decisions.”  Id. at 460.  They go on to say that 
“[c]onfusion about community stability stems from the fact that although Congress 
frequently reaffirms its desire to achieve community stability, it has not provided any 
operational guidelines for doing so.”  Id. at 479.  See also Report of the Society of 
mmunity Stability 13 (1989) (on file with 
thor) (noting that “the agency’s community stability policy is permissive rather than 
prescriptive.”); James P. Perry, Community Stability: Is There a Statutory Solution?, in 
COMMUNITY STABILITY IN FOREST-BASED ECONOMICS (Dennis C. Le Master & John H. 
Beuter, eds., 1989).  Perry notes that “Congress has not, in any legislation which applies 
generally to all National Forest System lands, provided any direction that requires the 
agencies to meet a community stability requirement.”  Id. at 32. 
227 In conducting timber sales, the NFMA directs the Secretary of Agriculture to select 
bidding methods that, among other things, “consider the economic stability of 
communities whose economies are dependent on such national forest materials,
ch other objectives as the Secretary deems necessary”; a
jectives of this Act and other Federal statutes.”  1
228 See 36 C.F.R. § 219.1. 
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ities of elected 
rep
s the core arguments 
of
multiple use, nor has it provided any operational guidelines for how it 
is to be achieved or reconciled with other goals. 
Another questionable assumption in public lands governance, 
perhaps even an oxymoron, is that of “scientific management.”  The 
historic rationale for administrative control was provided by 
progressive-era thinkers advocating managerial efficiency and a 
science of administration.  Their “politics/administration dichotomy” 
clearly separated the political responsibil
resentatives from the science of administration practiced by public 
administrators.229  “Scientific management” thus became the “secular 
religion” of many resource (and other) agencies shaped by this 
political philosophy.230  The USFS provides an example, says USFS 
critic Robert Nelson: “It was to be an organization run by 
professionals kept well separated from politics.  This separation 
would allow foresters to put science to use in the national forests in 
the service of the public interest.”231  In other words, broad goals 
might be charted by Congress, but politics ought never influence the 
science and efficiency of forest management. 
The fatal flaw in such thinking is that “[b]road discretion makes a 
politician out of a bureaucrat.”232  For Lowi, “every delegation of 
discretion away from electorally responsible levels of government to 
professional career administrative agencies is a calculated risk 
because politics will always flow to the point of discretion.”233  Thus, 
broad delegation of power to agencies contradict
 political neutrality and expertise made by those advocating more 
administrative control.  Lowi also notes the paradox of this scientific 
management defense, for whatever substantive specialization and 
professional judgment agencies might have, they are often displaced 
by formula decision making, formalistic analysis, systems language, 
                                                        
229 See Frank J. Goodnow, Politics and Administration in CLASSICS OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 25 (Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, eds., 3d ed. 1992) (contending 
th ics has to do with policies or expressions of the state will.  Administration has 
to
ssing why the paradigm no longer works for the USFS).  
Se
 to Serfdom:  Liberalism, Conservatism and 
Ad  REV. 295, 297 (1987). 
at “[p]olit
 do with the execution of these policies.”). 
230 Robert H. Nelson, The Religion of Forestry:  Scientific Management, 97(11) J. 
FORESTRY 4-8 (Nov. 1999) (discu
e generally HAYS, supra note 191; ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE 
RIGHTS (1995). 
231 Nelson, The Religion of Forestry, supra note 230, at 5. 
232 LOWI, supra note 197, at 304. 
233 Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads
ministrative Power,  36 AM. U.L.






and economic reductionism.234  These methodologies and cookbook 
decision making formulas are thus “replacing the very professional 
judgments for which Congress claims to be so respectful when it 
leaves its statutes so inadequately constructed.”235
These politicized bureaucrats also find themselves in a partic
ganizational culture with its own values, worldview, and priorities.  
This culture is shaped by the political and historic context in which it 
was born, its statutory mission and mandate, and the type of 
professionals and personnel within it.  These values matter a great 
deal, especially when an agency is given a broad and ambiguous 
mission and is subject to “capture” by the interest it is supposed to be 
regulating.  The organizational cultures of our public land agencies 
requires little reiteration,236 but a few examples are in order.  Wildlife 
management was long dominated by the “agricultural paradigm” in 
which game species were cultivated as a renewable crop to be 
harvested by the agency’s most politically and financially important 
clients—hunters, fishers, and trappers.237  The Corps of Engineers’ 
motto is “essayons,” French for “let us try.”  It is unsurprising, then, 
that the Corps’ conception of progress is pro-growth and construction, 
and the control of nature through engineering.238
The USFS provides what is perhaps the most studied example.  
USFS historian David Clary asserts that the Agency’s culture is more 
like a religion: its sacred mission was to provide wood to the world 
and avert a “timber famine.”239  This religious conviction, says Clary, 
explains much of the controversy surrounding national forest 
management in that the servant (USFS) “believed firmly that it knew 
better than the public what the public really wanted.”240  It thus foun
elf preaching the science and efficiency of forestry when the public 
demanded values other than timber.  The bottom line is that “value-
free implementation” is often a sham, and that unelected bureaucrats 
                                                        
234 Id. at 305. 
235 Id. 
236 See generally JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE 
TERRAIN (1985) (analyzing seven natural resource agencies from an organizational culture 
and political power perspective). 
237 Martin Nie, State Wildlife Policy and Management:  The Scope and Bias of Political 
Conflict, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 221, 223 (2004). 
238 Michael Grunwald, Engineers of Power:  An Agency of Unchecked Clout, 
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 10, 2000, at A1. (investigating the power and politics 
su
i. 
rrounding the Corps). 
239 CLARY, supra note 15, at xi. 
240 Id. at xi
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much discretionary power. 
licies.  But, this is silly, Presidents are elected for numerous 
reasons and policy positions that come bundled with others.  
Furthermore, when we look at the alf 
of the American pu ose voting against 
the
certainly happens, but it is more an example of what is wrong with 
m
with personal values and a worldview (that may be contrary to the 
public’s) should not be delegated too 
To finish our review, a few additional words must be said about 
accountability and administrative discretion.  As mentioned earlier, 
the issue is not as tidy as many people make it out to be; there are 
multiple conceptions of accountability, and our textbook 
understanding of it rarely happens in practice.241  Nevertheless, too 
much congressional delegation to agencies poses a real threat to basic 
democratic principles.  This is a multipart challenge.  First, there is 
the myth of executive-based accountability.  Accountability is not 
guaranteed just because a President appoints senior level 
administrators.  There is also the myth of the presidential mandate.  
Presidents may claim that their supposed mandate from the people 
gives them the legitimacy and public support needed to forward 
various po
 big electoral picture, including h
blic who usually fail to vote, th
 winner, and the strange calculus of the electoral college, this 
supposed mandate is as hollow as it looks.  We might also want to 
contrast presidential campaign rhetoric to the policy changes actually 
advanced in office.  And finally, it is worth asking whether the 
executive-based accountability approach could lead to a type of 
“imperial Presidency” that so scared the founders of the Republic.242
Second, is the problem of effective legislative oversight.  Lowi 
believes that “[e]ither it has a marginal influence on substantial 
problems or a significant influence on marginal problems.”243  Rarely 
is a substantive review of an agency or program done, and rarely do 
the tough questions get asked. 
What about control through the appropriations process?  This 
odern policymaking than one of effective democratic control.  It is 
not usually a case of Congress exerting its collective will and power 
of the purse, but rather a case of a few powerful members of Congress 
sitting on key appropriations committees exerting brute political 
power for minority special interests. 
                                                        
241 See WEBER,  infra note 276. 
242 See generally JAMES MADISON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter, 
ed., 1961). 
243 LOWI, supra note 197, at 308. 
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ew and possibly 
dis
l be stated during the debate, if 
there is one.  And the game often played is to leave laws vague, then 
insert “intent” int l Record—intent 
that was never expressed on the House or Senate floor during 
s the above arguments.  Five broad 
alt
What about the Congressional Review Act (CRA)?244  In theory, it 
is a useful new tool that Congress can use to revi
approve of federal agency rules.  In practice, however, it is rarely 
used due to a number of impediments.245 There is also the suggestion 
that confused administrators can go back and reconstruct the original 
intent of Congress in passing the vague and/or contradictory law.  But 
as our review of the ESA illustrates, this is problematic in numerous 
ways.  First, there is no one intent to do anything in this body.  
Multiple reasons for passing a law wil
o the mostly phony Congressiona
debate.246
III 
OPTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES 
There are various options and alternatives to administrative 
rulemaking and resource planning as a dominant approach to public 
lands conflict resolution.  The preferred alternative will depend on 
how compelling one find
ernatives are sketched here: prescriptive law (with choice-based, 
goal and standard-based, systemic, and unit-level options); 
administrative leadership and discretion; decentralization; 
comprehensive public lands law review; and policy experimentation.  
This organization is for conceptual purposes only.  Many of these 
alternatives and options are crosscutting and many principles and 
ideas found within them could be integrated into another coherent 
package.  But what is clear, from my standpoint, is the centrality of 
the statutory detail/administrative discretion issue in the future of 
environmental conflict and public lands governance. 
                                                        
244 The CRA was included as part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857-74 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-
808 (Supp. III 1997).  The CRA provides 
rev
Congress with a certain amount of time to 
246 LOWI, supra note 197, at 308. 
iew and possibly disapprove a rule that is defined as “major.”  Id. § 801(a)(3).  Under 
this Act, a major rule cannot become effective for at least 60 days after its publication so 
that Congress can consider the rule and possibly deal with it legislatively.  Id. 
245 Morton Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of Agency 
Rulemaking?:  A Brief Overview, Assessment, and Proposal for Reform, 51 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1051, 1058 (1999) (reviewing the major structural impediments to the effective use 
of the CRA.  He found in his 1999 analysis that out of 222 major rules and 15,199 non-
major rules, as defined in the CRA, only eight joint resolutions of disapproval had been 
introduced related to six rules, and that none had been passed by either house). 
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holarly admonitions.  So instead, the following 
dis
e d social diversity 
roversy surrounding ESA listing and delisting questions fall into 
th
tes multiple use without 
ve package.  Thus, the challenge with this alternative would 
   
 
Of course, the question of whether Congress should provide more 
statutory detail is much different than to question whether it is able to 
do so.  These days it seems as though Congress disagrees on the day 
of the week.  To be useful, then, we must go beyond providing 
unrealistic sc
cussion describes a broader menu of choices ranging in possible 
effectiveness and political feasibility. 
A.  Prescriptive Law Alternatives 
1.  The Choice-based Prescriptive Law Alternative 
The prescriptive law alternative calls for Congress to write more 
detailed and specific public land laws.  It would speak clearly and 
forcefully about the purpose and goals of our public lands and natural 
resources in the Twenty-First Century.  Choices would be made and 
trade-offs accepted.  Some might claim that Congress is incapable of 
drafting such language because of th ecological an
of the public-lands system. 
For example, no one-size-fits-all prescriptive law can resolve the 
site-specific forest management conflicts found in 155 national 
forests.  Well enough.  But how difficult would it be for Congress to 
take the lead and say yes or no to roadless area protection, or yes or 
no to snowmobiles in Yellowstone?  These are not hyper-technical 
questions that will challenge a busy Congress, but rather value and 
interest-based political questions that are most appropriate for 
legislative debate and resolution.  Moreover, what some might 
criticize as one-size-fits-all prescription, others might see as providing 
consistency.  This alternative follows the logic of Professor Lowi’s 
call for “juridical democracy” and “democratic formalism.”247  That 
is, Congress has the responsibility of making these hard decisions, 
and it is very capable of doing so. 
The problem with the neat prescriptive law alternative is that many 
public land issues are messy, scientifically complex, and site-specific.  
Cont
is category.  The prescriptive law alternative will also prove a 
challenge if Congress again manda
prioritizing, since finding the right balance of uses in our diverse 
national forests and rangelands cannot be done with a uniform 
legislati
                                                     
247 LOWI, supra note 197, at 298-313. 
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l Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) of 
19
ive.  Following the logic of environmental laws like the 
Cl
be to tease out the major policy choices for congressional resolution, 
while leaving other issues to alternative decision making venues 
(perhaps through more decentralized, collaborative-based 
approaches). 
Note that such choices can and have been isolated by Congress in 
the past.  For instance, the practice of clearcutting was central to 
NFMA’s formulation and debate.248  Alaska’s Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) provides another example.  Section 1003 of 
the Alaska Nationa
80 prohibits oil and gas development in the ANWR unless 
authorized by Congress.249  Congress, not the USFWS, has taken 
responsibility for the future of ANWR and can either designate the 
area as wilderness, permit oil and gas leasing, or simply take no 
action (leaving it in protected, albeit vulnerable status).  The point is 
that Congress has defined the issue as a legislative one and has not 
placed the USFWS in the line of fire.250
2.  The Goal and Standard-based Prescriptive Law Alternative 
There is also a weaker but more flexible version of the prescriptive 
law alternat
ean Air Act,251 it would be possible for Congress to pass laws 
mandating strict ends while leaving the means to achieve them as 
open and flexible as possible.  For example, look at motorized 
recreation, which is proving to be one of the biggest controversies on 
public lands today.252  Congress could find and declare that motorized 
recreation is deteriorating the integrity of the national forest system, 
and thus place further restrictions on its use.  It could do this by 
clearly stating acceptable use levels or by mandating that these 
vehicles be allowed on major forest roads only.  Then, it would be up 
to the service, forest planners, and perhaps some type of collaborative 
                                                        
248 See generally Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 22.  Congress had the option of 
choosing a more prescriptive or planning-based statute and chose the latter.  See supra Part 
II.A. 
249 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 
(1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (2000)). 
250  dealt with such an enormous responsibility.  Note, however, how Congress has
Qu ovisions, have become the norm because a 
sup il and gas exploration has been difficult to 
ac
 Carr, mation on Public 
La
estionable legislative tactics, like rider pr
ermajority vote to open the refuge for o
hieve. 
251 Current version found at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000). 
252 See generally Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. The Transfor
nds, 26 ECOLOGY L. Q. 140 (1999). 
Administrative Discretion in Public Lands Governance 275 





establishing a threshold basis for evaluating management proposals, 
and a biod ffirmative 
ob
says Keiter, “the proposal seeks to protect ecological co
                                                       
 
arrangement to figure out a way to meet these use levels or decide 
what roads to ope
articulate its values and goals while also recognizing the need for
flexibility in implementation. 
On the other hand, critics might argue that such a goal-based 
approach results in Congress, once again, dodging the really tough 
choices.  Mandating use limits, they would argue, is much different 
than deciding that a particular road, in a particular Congressional 
district, will close. 
Writing more intelligible and enforceable standards into public 
lands law is another possibility.  This could be done in a number of 
ways.  One option is to emulate the approach taken by Congress in 
passing the 1997 National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement 
Act.253  As discussed above, relatively specific management criteria 
were provided in this organic act, such as the mandate to maintain 
biological integrity, diversity, and environmental health.  Of course, 
for this option to work, such standards would have to be more 
meaningful than the ones already provided in law, such as the 
“unnecessary and undue degradation” standard provided in 
FLPMA.254
Another option is to pass a standards-based organic act serving as 
an umbrella for all public-land agencies.  Such a law wou
pplement rather than displace existing public-land laws. Robert 
Keiter has advanced such an approach for some time.255  He sees this 
option, perhaps in the form of a National Ecosystem Management and 
Restoration Act, as a way to provide agencies with new authority and 
responsibility for ecosystem management.256  Such a law, among 
other things, would establish clear priorities among multiple uses, 
acknowledge the need for coordinated landscape-level planning, and 
include at least two statutory standards: a nonimpairment s
iversity conservation standard imposing an a
ligation on the agencies to protect and restore species diversity.257  





253 See FISCHMAN, supra note 105, at 79. 
254 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2000). 
255 See Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line:  Constructing a Law of Ecosyste
nagement, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994). 
256 ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE 308 (2003). 
257 Id. at 309. 
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 uses and goals expressed in establishment legislation. 
      
processes without placing land managers in a straitjacket, rendering 
them unable to respond to unique local conditions or exceptional 
circumstances.”258
3.  Systemic or Unit-level Prescriptive Law 
The issue of scale is also important to this alternative.  Should 
Congress focus on making choices and setting goals at the public 
lands system level or at lower levels of governance and 
administration?  As discussed in Part II, we can glean quite a few 
lessons from the national park and national wildlife refuge 
experiences.  Within those systems, there is a tension between the 
unifying philosophies in their organic charters, and the piecemeal 
establishment legislation that creates individual parks and refuges.  
There is certainly something to be gained by an agency and system 
having a recognizable and consistent mission integrating far flung 
units.  Without one, there is a risk of disintegration because no 
cohesive philosophy holds the parts together.  This would lead to 
recommending that Congress make choices or set goals at the system-
wide level.  But as discussed earlier, rewriting an agency’s organic act 
may not be enough because of other priorities set in establishment 
legislation.  If Congress went down this road, it would have to 
provide language in a new organic charter that would trump 
incompatible
The other option is for Congress to make choices or set goals at 
lower levels through continued use of establishment legislation and 
similar approaches.  This could be done by disaggregating a public 
lands system into its component parts and making choices on an 
individualized level.  Instead of making one systemic decision, 
Congress would be making dozens of piecemeal decisions.  
Prescription would still be provided, but it would be more tailored and 
site-specific than if done across the board at the system level. 




enforcement mechanisms depart from exis
Id.  Keiter continues: 
he statutory proposal does not envision a radical restructuring of agencies or
oundaries; the proposed legal standards are not new, nor do the procedural or 
ting law.  By linking the nonimpairment 
standard with an ecosystem restoration obligation, the proposal should help 
promote truly sustainable resource management policies, thus enhancing 
community stability and perhaps restoring some peace on the public domain. 
Id. at 310. 
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A ve 
disc rd and might be 
se
Such an acknowledgement would certainly change the way 
agencies do business.  No longer would they have to make value and 
in olitical choices and then hide them in mountains of 
sc
cision making.  Instead, agencies will come 
cle c 
se .  
M  
alt
                                   
B.  The Administrative Discretion Alternative 
t the opposite end of the continuum is the administrati
retion alternative.  This is rather straightforwa
en as the equivalent of the no change alternative, or changes could 
be made giving agencies even greater levels of discretionary freedom.  
Taken further, this alternative suggests that we be more explicit, and 
some might say more honest, about the role of politics in agency 
rulemaking.  That is to say, we should recognize that professional 
expertise and public opinion takes a back seat to the politics and 
ideology of the party in power.  We should simply acknowledge that 
the “synoptic” decision making ideal found in NEPA and rulemaking 
is for the most part an impossibility.  This is the ideal model in which 
a decision maker collects all relevant facts, considers all alternative 
policies and possible consequences of each, and then chooses the 
policy with the highest probability of achieving the agreed goal in the 
most efficient way.259  It is an ideal deeply entrenched in 
environmental impact statements and statutes specifying that agencies 
make rules on the basis of “the best available evidence” or 
“substantial evidence on the rulemaking record as a whole.”260  
Instead of asking the impossible, the public would come to expect that 
our public land agencies, staying within the broad contours of the law, 
will be pulled this way and that depending on party politics.  They 
will be conservation-oriented in some terms, less so in others.  This 
alternative, in short, will view rulemaking as it really is, delegated 
legislation, and agencies for what they really are, subordinate 
legislatures. 
terest-based p
ientific and technical information, in an effort to get by the courts 
that demand synoptic de
an and make choices that might not be rational in the synopti
nse, but reasonable and well within the broad guidelines of the law
artin Shapiro explains what an agency could do with such an
ernative: 
                     
, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?  14-15 (1988) (analyzing the 
ch
259 MARTIN SHAPIRO
anging relationship between the judicial branch and public administration, with a 
thorough discussion of pluralist, synoptic, and prudential approaches to administrative 
decision making). 
260 Id. at 15. 
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ordinate legislatures 
making a good d constraints and 
in the face of considerable uncertainty about facts and diverse and 
It will be allowed to say: “Six years ago in a Democratic 
administration, this agency chose B because B was a good guess in 
line with Democratic political beliefs.  B was a perfectly respectable 
and legal choice.  If Republicans had been in control then, or if the 
agency’s prudential estimates had been a little different then, the 
agency would have chosen C.  C would have been a perfectly 
respectable and legal choice.  And it follows that because, if we had 
been running things then, we would have chosen C rather than B, 
we can respectably and legally now replace B with C without 
having to pretend B was ‘wrong’ and C is ‘right.’”261
This alternative is contingent upon the courts changing the way 
that they evaluate agency decision making.  According to Shapiro, 
courts treat agencies as if they were “engaged in a true science of 
synoptic public administration[.]”262  Instead, “[a]gencies ought to be 
allowed to act and to admit that they act as sub
eal of law within broad congressional 
changing political sentiments.”263
This alternative may not be as radical as it might sound.  It does not 
suggest that agencies be free to do whatever they want, and that 
science, analysis, and rigor be dammed—though that is a danger.  
Rather, it moves agencies from the synoptic charade to “prudential 
deliberation.”264  Just like legislatures, they will do their best with 
tough issues in a complex and uncertain world.  Shapiro explains the 
prudential tradition as a particularly useful way to deal with the 
values, science, and uncertainty important to administrative law.265  It 
need not be cynical nor relativist.  Rather, through moral discourse 
and political deliberation and debate, agencies, like legislatures, can 
                                                        
261 Id. at 170-71. 
262 Id. at 171.  According to Shapiro, courts have come to expect that agencies defend 
their chosen rules synoptically. 
So instead of telling the truth, agencies can lie; this is mostly what they do these 
days.  They can dress each of their guestimates about the facts, their choices among 
statutory ambiguities, their compromises to facilitate implementation, and their 
limitation on alternatives considered in enormous, multilayered costumes of 
technocratic rationality . . . [i]t is much easier to eventually win court approval by 
piling on more and more synopticism than by persisting in telling the truth. 
Id. at 151-52. 
263 Id. at 171. 
lains prudence as the belief that we “can achieve some intermediate 
lev  lies far short of ‘scientific certainty,’ but far 
be f that moral discourse can lead to sound moral 
ju art of this prudential tradition.” Id. at 135-36. 
264 Shapiro exp
el of assurance about moral values that
yond mere personal assertion.  The belie
dgment . . . is p
265 Id. 
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prescriptive federal rules often f
and diverse society.  There is also the concern that if Congress was 
asked to write more prescriptive laws it would do so by subdelegating 
its responsibilities to committees.  So what is the alternative?  For 
 
make prudential policy judgments.  The alternative, in essence, 
recommends that courts view statutes as saying to an agency: “You 
may not go beyond certain boundaries, but within those boundaries 
you are free to do what we the Congress normally do—our prudential 
best.  You may not do X or Y but you are free to choose prudentially 
among A, B, C and D.”266
The problem with such an alternative is especially clear in the 
environmental arena.  Those advocating conservation are at a 
perpetual disadvantag
nvironmentalists remind us, extinction is forever.  Roads, fo
mple, cannot be built and then removed after every four-year
tion cycle.  A decision to build roads today is forcing roads 
re generations that may or may not want them, while a decisio
to build keeps that option open for the future.  Thus, th
rnative seems to give those advocating development an
action a dangerous advantage, for it basically legitimiz
anent losses.  One side must only win once. 
C.  The Decentralization Alternative 
Another possibility is the decentralization of public lands 
management.  Perhaps too much congressional delegation stems from 
the federal government’s over-reliance on prescriptive strategies of 
centralized command-and-control regulation.267  The delegation 
debate merely focuses on symptoms says Richard Stewart, “[i]nstead, 
we should focus on the underlying problem of excessive reliance on 
centralized directives to legislate conduct throughout a vast and 
varied nation.”268  This, says Stewart, has led to “political overload at 
the center” and this overload “has resulted in a massive transfer of 
decisional power to federal administrative bureaucracies.”269
The reasoning behind this alternative is that demands for less 
agency rulemaking and more centralized prescriptive law will end up 
making the overload situation worse.  First, centralized and 
ail to make sense in such a complex 
                                                        
266 Id. at 170. 
267 See Stewart, supra note 194, at 328. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 329. 
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 Rather than giving 
The rationale behind this alternative, in sum, is that 
co
 
Stewart, “[t]he only real solution is to forswear our excessive 
addiction to centralized prescription.”270  For him the solution lies in 
“reconstitutive strategies” such as outright deregulation or devolution 
to state and local governments.271  But, because markets, states, and 
local governments cannot always advance social goals such as 
environmental protection, the alternative is to reconstitute institutions 
“in order to ensure that national goals are served without detailed 
central prescription of conduct.”272  This means that most relevant 
decisions will be made within subsystems rather than at the center, 
and that delegation will still happen, but decisions will be delegated to 
reconstituted subsystems rather than to administrative agencies.273  
Stewart summarizes: 
We need broad delegations to achieve national goals.  The 
delegations required by prescriptive regulation, however, are the 
wrong type of delegation to the wrong people. 
federal agencies and reviewing courts the responsibility for 
designing detailed conduct blueprints or subdelegating power 
within Congress and the presidency, we should give decisional 
power back to various decision makers within the various 
economic, governmental, and social institutions of our society, 
transmitting the delegation through new structures that will align 
their decisions with national goals.274
This alternative will be attractive to those advocating more regional 
or localized collaborative environmental strategies,275 and those 
concerned about one-size-fits-all political edicts.  It might also prove 
a useful way to deal with the multiple use dilemma.  Instead of 
wrestling with the concept and its abstractions in Congress, multiple 
use would be given meaning from the bottom-up.  It will mean 
different things in different places, as it does now, but it will be 
legitimized by reconstituted institutions rather than by a centralized 
agency.  
ngressional delegation and resulting agency discretion stem from a 
                                                        
270 Id. at 335. 
271 See id. at 335-43. 
001) (exploring the 
po
272 Id. at 336. 
273 Id. at 337. 
274 Id. at 342.  See Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86 (1986) 
(describing reconstitutive strategies). 
275 See generally DANIEL KEMMIS, THIS SOVEREIGN LAND (2
ssibility of decentralizing public lands management from the national to regional level); 
ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE (Philip Brick et al. eds., 2001) (reviewing the growth of 
collaborative conservation in Western environmental management); Behan, supra note 21 
(advocating a more localized approach to natural resource policy and conflict resolution). 
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ional environmental standards 
and federal public land laws, we will still have to deal with the 
statutory det
larger problem—the federal government trying to do too much and 
often doing it poorly. 
Instead of delegating the tough choices to bureaucracy, those 
choices would be delegated to collaborative and decentralized 
institutions and/or groups.  Note, however, that the central question 
posed here—how much detail and prescription should be provided in 
public lands law—must still be addressed.  Few, if any, proposals 
recommend that collaborative processes completely replace the larger 
national environmental policy and legal framework.  Instead, 
proponents of these processes often try to show how decentralized 
and collaborative processes are supplementary to national 
environmental laws, and how they can be used to more effectively 
implement those laws.276  In other words, these collaborative 
proposals are most often championed within the context of national 
environmental standards.277  They thus operate within the decision 
making space provided by NEPA, the ESA, NFMA, FLPMA and 
other public land laws.  The point is that as long as collaborative 
groups recognize the necessity of nat
ail/administrative discretion issue. 
There are myriad roles that Congress and public land agencies 
could play in this alternative.  One possibility is for Congress to retain 
the broad multiple-use mandate while giving charge and sanction to 
collaborative groups to find new ways of moving forward.  As long as 
national laws are upheld, these groups would have some assurance 
that their plans would be faithfully implemented by agencies and 
funded by Congress.  Such collaborative arrangements would be very 
site-specific and have to be passed by Congress and signed by the 
President, ensuring additional layers of legitimacy and accountability.  
We would still have a case of congressional delegation of authority, 
but this time the decentralized, collaborative groups would get more 
decision making discretion, not bureaucracy.  Another option is for 
                                                        
276 See EDWARD P. WEBER, BRINGING SOCIETY BACK IN 247 (2003) (analyzing how 
th ntary system of accountability 
by :  
Grassroots ecosystem management “can be a 
lic 
la
ree prominent collaborative groups provided a suppleme
te and federal statutes and systems of accountability being nested within larger sta
mechanism for translating top-down, one-
size-fits-all laws into a place-specific form without violating them.”). 
277 After all, these environmental laws and standards have partly sparked the 
collaborative movement by giving non-industry stakeholders a seat at the negotiating 
table.  See generally BARB CESTERO, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MEETING 84 (1999) (“In 
this way, collaboration can be a tool to implement, or adapt, but not circumvent, pub
nd laws[.]”). 




 does offer a 
ho
ecosystem and biodiversity-based management?281  Or perhaps we 
sh iple use mandate, and instead figure out ways to 
   
 
blic land agencies to take the lead and use collaborative groups to 
give site-specific meaning to the national goals and discretionary 
language. 
As discussed above, this alternative raises the hackles of some who 
would like more congressional responsibility and accountability in 
public lands law.278  Not only is Congress passing the buck to 
agencies, they argue, but now these agencies are passing it along to 
self-selected and largely unaccountable stakeholders.  While this issue 
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to note that the 
accountability issue is more complicated than it first appears.  Notions 
of democratic accountability have changed throughout the years, and 
there exists no consensual understanding of what it means.279  One 
could argue that the status quo is a prime example of too little 
accountability provided by top-down federal lands management.  
After all, accountability is often obscured by our system of che
d balances; separation of powers; divided party government; 
congressional committees; and various planning, funding and budget 
problems.  How often does our textbook understanding of democratic 
accountability—that our elected political representatives will pay the 
price for poor environmental management decisions—happen in 
reality?  Finally, while this alternative does not negate the importance 
of the statutory detail/administrative discretion issue, it
st of new ways of thinking about it. 
D.  The Comprehensive Review Alternative 
Convening another public lands law review commission is another 
alternative worth considering.  Some believe that the current statutory 
and regulatory framework has become impractical, and that it is time 
to embark on a systematic review of our public land laws.280  Perhaps 
it is time to jettison the idea of multiple use and formally embrace 
what some consider to be the de facto governing principle of 
ould retain the mult
                                                     
278 See Coggins, supra note 206; LOWI, supra note 197. 
279 See Weber, supra note 276. 
280 In August of 2003, several leading natural resource professionals, academics, and 
interest group representatives met at the “Montana Summit” to consider public lands 
governance and the possibility of convening another public lands law review commission.  
See James Burchfield & Perry Brown, Montana Summit White Paper, (Dec. 11, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with University of Montana and on file with author). 
281 See Thomas, supra note 222. 
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convening another commission—can be partly traced back to 
statutory lan e 
is 
many of the archaic laws, or what Charles Wilkinson calls “the lords 




streamline cumbersome or redundant decision making and analytical 
processes?282  Should a compatibility standard and tiered use 
framework, as found in the National Wildlife Refuge Improvement 
Act, be applied elsewhere?  These and a host of other questions are 
ripe for comprehensive and careful review. 
Much of the supposed “gridlock” found in public lands 
governance—one of the factors driving the renewed interest in 
guage.  While other intervening forces are at work, ther
a sequence in which problematic and/or evasive statutory language 
leads to a lot of planning and promulgating of rules and regulations, 
which are then challenged by interest groups in court.  Such interest 
groups contend that agencies are not doing what Congress intended 
them to do.  And, as discussed above, courts have increasingly asked 
agencies to meticulously defend their decisions in synoptic-
comprehensive-rational ways.  This has resulted in agencies spending 
a lot of time producing “the best available evidence” and “substantial 
evidence on the rulemaking record as a whole.”283  The story is more 
complex than this, but providing more detail and specificity in 
statutory language would most likely change this chain of events. 
A commission might help focus attention on problematic statutory 
language or lack of congressional direction.  It could also survey 
of yesterday,”284 and assess how well they fit into today’s political 
landscape.  There have been a number of such public land law 
commissions used 
st one—the longest period ever separating their use.285
An increasing number of people are calling for some type of 
286mprehensive review for a number of reasons.   First, the public 
                                                        
282 See USDA FOREST SERVICE, supra note 46. 
283 See supra Part IV.B. 
284 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 20 (1992). 
285 See Perry R. Hagenstein, Commissions and Public Land Policies:  Setting the Stage 
for Change, 54 DENV. L. J. 619, 620 (1977) (describing history of public land law 
commissions). 
286 See Jerome C. Muys & John D. Leshy, Whither the Public Lands?, in ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE § 3.01 (1995) (contending 
that “the time is ripe for another review of the appropriate legislative and administrative 
policies for the future of the public lands”); see also Mark B. Lambert, Public Land 
Commissions:  Historical Lessons and Future Considerations (2003) (Master’s Thesis, 
University of Montana) (providing a more recent assessment of arguments for and against 
convening another commission) (on file with the University of Montana). 
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implementation.  The formation of a 
co
E.  The Policy Experimentation Alternative 
lands problem might not stem from any particular law, but from how 
they work or don’t work together with other laws.  Therefore, it might 
be necessary to stand back and evaluate the full canon of 
environmental and public land laws, administrative rules, executive 
orders, and judicial decisions to evaluate their true impact on land 
management and policy 
mmission might also encourage productive debate and deliberation, 
and maybe even some compromise among stakeholders and the 
public-at-large.  Though it is impossible to “de-politicize” such an 
undertaking, a commission might provide the type of critical analysis 
and reflection that has become rare in Washington.  Certainly a lot 
has changed in the past 40 years, from the emergence of conservation 
biology and ecosystem management to new law governing the 
National Wildlife Refuge System, so there is much to learn and apply. 
Another alternative is to begin a period of deliberate and careful 
policy experimentation in which various options and alternatives are 
tried and evaluated.  In other words, let us experiment with a number 
of different approaches to public lands governance on a small scale 
and monitor what happens.  We can seek out cases of innovation in 
governance and perhaps diffuse and adapt them to different 
contexts.287  Experimentation is already taking place in numerous 
forms, like stewardship contracting on the national forests,288 
collaborative conservation,289 and conservation trusts.290  These, and 
dozens of other innovative ideas, could be tested within the safe 
harbor provided by federal environmental standards and laws.291  The 
                                                        
287 See generally Ronald D. Brunner & Christine H. Colburn, Harvesting Experience, 
in FINDING COMMON GROUND Ch. 6 (Ronald D. Brunner et al. eds., 2002) (examining the 
process of innovation, diffusion and adaptation in collaborative conservation and natural 
resources governance). 
288 See USDA FOREST SERVICE STEWARDSHIP CONTRACTING, at http://www.fs 
.fed.us/forestmanagement/projects/stewardship/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 23, 2004); 
see generally PINCHOT INSTITUTE, at http://www.pinchot.org/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2004). 
r consolidations of the public lands, changing the USFS mission (and  
289 See generally ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE, supra note 275; BRUNNER & COLBURN, 
supra note 287; JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE, MAKING 
COLLABORATION WORK (2000). 
290 See generally SALLY K. FAIRFAX & DARLA GUENZLER, CONSERVATION TRUSTS 
(2001). 
291 See BEAVER, supra note 32.  The Natural Resources Law Center has surveyed and 
organized the various proposals for changing National Forest policy.  Some of these 
proposals include:  new planning and budgeting approaches, divestment of the federal 
estate, additions to o
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l management.  But, when thinking about 
ex
 and what sustainability means in the Twenty-First 
Ce
 
administrative fragmentation of the public lands system is often 
criticized, partly because of the difficulties presented to ecosystem 
and landscape-leve
perimentation, this fragmentation becomes diversity, and these 
public land units become laboratories of democracy.  In short, we 
need more case examples of innovation and sustainability, and many 
public land units governed by individualized establishment legislation 
could serve that function. 
Of course, not all public lands governance problems are related to 
statutory language.292  In many landscapes with checkerboard and 
mixed land ownership patterns, the challenges of governance go well 
beyond the lack of specificity in public lands law.293  But in these 
cases, experimentation becomes even more important as it has 
become increasingly obvious that we must look beyond federal 
boundaries if we are serious about ecosystem and community 
health.294  For these complex patchworks of land, we need to try a 
mix of institutional arrangements that are uniquely fitted to place and 
context. 
But despite its limitations, experimentation focusing explicitly on 
statutory detail and the lack thereof is also necessary.  As a first step, 
it might be advisable to begin asking the American public what it 
thinks about public lands management and the ideas of multiple use, 
biodiversity,
ntury.  This could be done, in the spirit of experimentation, not 
with the typical public opinion survey, but with the systematic use of 
“deliberative polling.”295  This approach eschews the sort of 
                                                                                                                       
different ways that it could be done), prioritizing among multiple uses, market-oriented 
reforms, and adaptive management procedures.  Another example is provided by the 
Forest Options Group, a collection of interest group leaders, agency officials, and policy 
analysts whom have proposed a number of pilot projects in the areas of ent
bud
repreneurial 
See generally Martin Nie, Drivers of Natural Resource-based Political Conflict, 36 
POL’Y SCIENCES 307 (2003) (analyzing twelve drivers of “wicked” environmental 
conflicts in natural resources management). 




e generally STEWARDSHIP ACROSS BOUNDARIES (Richard L. Knight & Peter B. 
La
geting, collaborative management, collaborative planning, forest trusts, and funding 
models based out of gross receipts and user fees set by a rate board.  See THOREAU 
INSTITUTE, THE SECOND CENTURY REPORT (2003), available at http://www.ti.org/2c.html 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2004) 
292
rmal and Informal Claims to Federal Lands, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 630 (1999) (showing 
the limitations of focusing solely on federal ownership, jurisdiction and decision ma
proving federal lands management). 
294 Se
ndres eds., 1998) 
295 See JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE (1995). 
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 less resource use than more, or vice versa, but we 
wi






Ref  a 
tiere e in this situation, and what political 
co
model becomes a trend, our national forest system could become as 
 
fo
                                                       
 
unconsidered “doorstep opinion” in which we have become so 
accustomed, and instead asks a sample of the public to seriously 
reflect and analyze policy issues after a prolonged period of study.  It 
is in many ways deliberative democracy in action, and it could 
certainly help in considering the values, beliefs, and opinions of the 
American public on these issues.  Perhaps the public is more 
comfortable with
ll not know until we ask the public to seriously consider these 
choices and their trade-offs.  Such an experiment, perhaps part of a 
comprehensive public lands law review, may c
tral issues and choices in the debate and provide an important c
ecision makers. 
nother possibility is to provide statutory clarification and n
slative language on one land unit or administrative area.  Wh
ld happen, for example, if we applied the approach outlined in t
uge Improvement Act to a national forest unit?  What might
d use framework look lik
alitions and majorities might form?  (For example, perhaps such an 
arrangement would mobilize a stronger coalition among the 
environmental, hunting, and fishing communities.)  The strong move 
in collaborative conservation provides myriad examples of what this 
alternative might look like on the ground.  In the Sierra Nevada, for 
instance, the controversial Quincy Library Group eventually won 
congressional endorsement of its plan for three national forests.296  
There is relatively detailed language in this legislation,297 though it 
seems unclear at this point of how it is supposed to fit with other 
statutory obligations held by the USFS.  But, as discussed earlier, 
there are also potential drawbacks to this approach.  If the Quincy 
fragmented and disintegrated as our national park and refuge system 
lands, governed as they are by a hodgepodge of establishment 
legislation. 
There are also a number of innovative ways in which we might 
meld the strengths of legislative and bureaucratic leadership.  The 
administrative rulemaking, NEPA and resource planning processes,
r example, could become much more inclusive and participatory in 
 
rally Dave Owen, Prescriptive Laws, Uncertain Science, and Political 
St
296 See gene
ories:  Forest Management in the Sierra Nevada, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 747 (2002). 
297 See Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act, 16 U.S.C. § 2104 
(2000). 
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ability while also allowing 
ro
to maximize the chances ile diminishing the 
risk of losing all their in  similar logic, a public 
 
the future.298  This could bring them closer to the democratic ideal, 
providing an important level of account
om for administrative leadership and expertise to flourish. 
NEPA is currently receiving this type of attention.  A number of 
environmental professionals have shown great interest in the prospect 
of using collaborative processes to improve NEPA decision 
making.299  The U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution 
has taken this proposal a step forward, moreover, and is investigating 
“how pilot projects can be used to evaluate the potential role of 
collaboration, consensus building, and appropriate dispute resolution 
processes in improving implementation of [NEPA], specifically 
within the context of federal lands and natural resource 
management.”300
A “diversified policy portfolio” is one way of thinking about this 
alternative.301  Daniel Kemmis uses this term to capture the sort of 
approach that might be needed at the moment: 
Investors dealing with similar complexity in the financial arena 
keep some money in stocks, some in bonds, and some in real estate 
of substantial gains wh
vestments.  By a
lands policy portfolio should probably now include at least three 
simultaneous elements: comprehensive review of the entire public 
lands system, incremental reform of the system, and a deliberate 
period of experimentation.302
Regarding the latter, Kemmis reviews a number of proposals 
calling “for legislatively authorized experiments or pilot projects that 
are to be implemented, monitored and evaluated through various 
forms of collaborative governance.”303  In forest management, for 
                                                        
298 See Nie, supra note 4 (reviewing changes that could be made to rulemaking and 
planning processes, like electronic rulemaking, ambitious scoping, and embedding 
collaborative groups into the rulemaking process, among others). 
299 O’Connor Center for the Rocky Mountain West and Institute for Environment and 




vironmental Decision Making? (2000), available at http://www.uwyo.edu/enr/ienr/ 
nepamain.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2004). 
300 U.S. INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON A NEPA PILOT PROJECTS INITIATIVE 4 (August 29, 2001), 
available at http://www.ecr.gov/pdf/USIECR%20Report%20to%20Senators %208-30-
01.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2004). 
301 Daniel Kemmis, Region 7:  An Innovative Approach to Planning on or Near P
nds, 55 No. 8 LAND USE & ZONING DIGEST 3, 4 (August 2003). 
302 Id. at 4. 
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d be 
selected based on what could be learned. 
The experimental alternative is radical in the sense that it 
acknowledges the need for fundamental change in public lands 
governance, while also conservative in its scope and application.  It 
offers an opportunity to try new methods of problem solving and 
conflict resolution, without betting it all on one highly uncertain 
solution.  In so doing, it might also help de-escalate conflict and 
minimize some risks related to changes in governance.  Perhaps this is 
why experimentation in the form of pilot projects has received 
support from organizations like the Society of American Foresters305 
and the Western Governor’s Association.306  Of course, such support 
from groups like this may scare part of the environmental community.  
This is understandable, partly because much of the problem in 
governance is caused by poor implementation, not just indecisive 
legislative language.  But experimentation could also be beneficial as 
a way to advance the next generation of conservation goals, ones that 
will be more complex and require new tools and ways of thinking. 
CONCLUSION 
The enduring question of how much detail to provide in laws, and 
how much discretion to delegate to land management agencies, is 
                                                       
instance, the idea of a “Region 7” is explored as a way to test new and 
innovative approaches within an existing administrative unit in the 
USFS.304  A number of experiments, trials, and pilot projects could 
flow from the bottom-up and be housed within this virtual region 
(region 7 of the USFS was split into regions 8 and 9 and thus 
basically disappeared).  After receiving congressional authorization 
and a mandate to experiment, a number of different trials woul
 
304 Id. at 3-9; see Community-Based Land Management and Charter Forests:  
Oversight Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health of the 
Committee on Resources, 107th Cong. 2d sess. (2002) (statement of former Congressman 
Pat Williams). 
305 Society of American Foresters (SAF), Pilot Projects for Evaluating Innovative 
Federal Land Management Opportunities, Adopted by the Executive Committee of the 
SAF Council on August 4, 2003 (on file with author) (Advocating “the development, 
authorization, and implementation of pilot projects to test alternative approaches for 
managing federal forest lands . . . to address and help resolve the ecological, economic, 
and social challenges presented by the currently complex and confusing statutory and 
regulatory framework that encumbers federal lands management decision making.”). 
306 Western Governor’s Association, Forest Health Summit Recommendations (June 
19, 2003), available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/fire/forest-summit-recs-
fin.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004) (recommending the use of experimental pilot projects as 
a way to address forest health). 
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central to any analysis of environmental conflict and public lands 
governance.  Many divisive environmental conflicts are exacerbated 
by problematic statutory language that tell our public land agencies 
relatively little about what they should be doing and a lot about how 
they should go about doing it.  At the very least, this language 
explains why our public land agencies have become the central 
brokers of conflict resolution and why administrative rulemaking and 
resource planning processes are the dominant venues in which these 
conflicts are managed.  The result is that these processes are stressed 
to their limits and agencies continually find themselves in political 
quagmires.  Each of the alternatives discussed above have something 
to offer and come bundled with various risks and uncertainties.  Each 
also varies in potential effectiveness and political feasibility.  
Whatever the preferred alternative, the statutory detail-administrative 
discretion challenge will, and must, be a central part of the debate.  It 
is a tension that must be continually revisited, and perhaps 
recalibrated, and now might be a particularly good time to do so. 
